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There are three independent essays in my dissertation with the analysis of Home Equity, 
Mortgage Distress, Consumption, and Assets Management during the Financial Crisis. The 
financial crisis began in middle 2008 and affected households in many aspects. My dissertation 
can let us have a better understanding of the effect of financial crisis on households and some of 
their responses to the crisis.  
The first essay analyzes the effect of financial crisis on household consumption. The 
results indicate that the financial crisis affected household consumption behavior not only 
through decreasing income and wealth but also through changing the household’s consumption 
responses to changes of home equity and other financial status. 
The second essay studies borrowing decisions and other factors related to the run-up in 
housing prices in 1999-2007, their precipitous decline in 2007-2009, and how they contributed to 
mortgage distress and foreclosures as of 2009-2011. Often expecting further price appreciation 
or responding to a positive family labor market and income circumstance, homeowners, 
supported by their lenders, allocated too much of their family income to support house payments 
and put themselves in a risky position. 
The third essay explores the financial behavior of households with respect to stock 
market participation, both in a time of rising equity values and then a substantial overall decline. 
The repeated panels show some decline in new entrants to the stock market and also some rise in 
exits from the stock market when comparing 2007-09 to 2005-07. In terms of life cycle effects, 
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families headed by a person age 65 or older were less likely to exit in good times (2005-07) and 
were more likely to become stock owners in both 2005-07 and 2007-09. Families experiencing 
home mortgage payment difficulties are shown to have been more likely to sell equities and to 
not become new participants. In this way the adverse changes in one asset category (owner 
occupied housing) connect to a change in the demand for another asset category (stocks). This is 





















Chapter 1: The Effects of Home Equity and Other Financial 
Assets on Household Consumption of Food Expenditures and 
Vehicle Acquisition During the Financial Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
The largest single, non-pension asset in the asset portfolio of many households is housing 
equity, which accounts for more than 35% of the median overall household’s wealth (Hurst, 
Luoh, and Stafford 1998). Wolff (2010) shows that 33% of a household’s total assets were 
composed of owner-occupied housing in 2007. Numerous studies show that consumption and 
housing equity or wealth are highly correlated (Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi 2010 and 
Iacoviello 2011). In addition, Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) and Dvornak and Kohler 
(2003) show the effect of housing wealth on consumption.  
The co-movements between housing wealth and consumption may be different across 
different consumption categories. Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) show that non-durable 
consumption is more sensitive to changing housing wealth, while durable consumptions are more 
sensitive to the change in financial wealth. Through analyzing Health and Retirement Study data, 
Sun (2010) finds that non-durable consumption for the elderly is greatly affected by changes in 
housing wealth. The information about the differing co-movements between housing wealth and 
various consumption categories is important for firms and government policy makers. They can 
take more effective action based on this knowledge. 
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There are three main explanations for the co-movements between housing wealth and 
consumption in the literature. Firstly, households determine consumption levels based on their 
life-cycle overall wealth. The change of housing wealth results in the change of life-cycle overall 
wealth, and then results in the change of consumption. This explanation is supported by Case, 
Quigley, and Shiller (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2007), Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009), 
and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011). 
Secondly, there are some common factors that drive both housing wealth and 
consumption. The movement of those common drivers, while not the causal relationship between 
housing wealth and consumption, produces the co-movements of housing wealth and 
consumption. King (1990) and Pagano (1990) argue that expected future income increases may 
drive both the housing wealth and consumption. Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Attanasio, 
Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester (2008) also support this argument.  
Thirdly, increased housing wealth can act as collateral to relax the borrowing constraint 
of households, and then they can change current consumption levels to smooth life-cycle 
consumption (Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Hurst and Stafford 2004, and Cooper 2009).  
Besides these factors, the 2005-2009 period was characterized by the onset of a 
pronounced decline in the labor market. Unemployment rose dramatically from 4.6% in June 
2007 to more than 9.0% in the summer of 2009. How did these co-occurring factors shape 
consumption expenditures? I also include the employment status of the household head in the 
empirical analysis. 
This paper focuses on the time period of 2007-2009 to estimate the effect of change in 
home equity, while also including other independent variables, such as income, wealth without 
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home equity, and employment status of head, on consumption of food and vehicle expenditures. 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) main family data are used in this paper. PSID 
main family data have more than 8,000 observations with over 5,000 variables in the areas of 
housing, utilities, employment status, income, wealth, pension, and the consumption categories 
of childcare, food, vehicles, and other transportation.  
Before the empirical analysis, I constructed a theoretical model and implemented 
computer simulations to capture the effect of home equity on household consumption 
expenditures. Home equity works as a buffer stock to smooth future household consumption. A 
household with a substantial negative home equity (“underwater”) will default on mortgage 
payments in the context of utility maximization over time. This result is supported by the 
empirical analysis in this paper. 
There are four main features in this paper compared with the previous literature: 
(1) The theoretical model not only captures the role of home equity and household income but 
also includes the possibility of mortgage foreclosure for a household with a deep 
“underwater” home equity position.  
(2) The new opportunity to focus on a period with major housing price slump in numerous major 
housing markets. The effect of home equity change on consumption during this kind of 
period may be different from the effect during more stable periods because of the speed and 
extent of the decrease in home equity.  
(3) PSID has more detailed measures in home equity, other wealth without home equity, income, 
employment status, and consumption, and all those measures are at the household level. This 
micro data structure allows us to work with more flexible models. Some existing literature 
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also uses household level micro data, such as data from Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
and Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE). Some studies separate consumption into durable 
and nondurable categories, but only a very limited amount of recent literature focuses on the 
analysis of more detailed consumption categories, such as food eaten at home expenditures 
and food eaten out expenditures (Hofferth and Curtin (2005)). Hall and Mishkin (1982) and 
Skinner (1987) used the PSID food consumption expenditure data several decades ago. In 
addition, the detailed measures of household wealth and employment status in the PSID data 
can allow a more comprehensive analysis. For example, if government policy makers and 
U.S. auto producers have more specific information about the household’s vehicle 
consumption in response to a financial crisis, they can take more effective action to deal with 
financial disturbances.  
(4) Both home owners and renters are analyzed in this paper, and significantly different 
consumption behaviors are found between those two groups. The differences may result from 
other factors besides home equity, such as overall wealth.   
Empirical analysis shows that the change of food eaten at home expenditure is not 
significantly affected by the change of household financial status, while both the change of 
expenditure for food eaten out and the vehicle acquisition decision are significantly affected in 
response to the change of household financial status, and the responses differ across the two sub-
periods of 2005-2007 and 2007-2009. Whether the head of household (“head”) has a job is more 
crucial to the vehicle acquisition decision for renters than for home owners.  
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition is a method that allows one to characterize households’ 
different consumption responses to changes in financial status before and during the financial 
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crisis based on a changing regression structure. Specifically, there is a significant “coefficients 
effect” for the change in food eaten out expenditures and vehicle acquisition. Households 
changed their consumption attitudes toward food eaten out and vehicles during the financial 
crisis, a result consistent with expectations as measured by declining consumer confidence as the 
recession was setting in. Further, the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition result shows that, in 
response to the financial crisis, home owners adjusted vehicle consumption at a more significant 
level than did renters.  
In addition, mortgage foreclosure is analyzed in this paper. Households with deep 
“underwater” mortgages are more likely to foreclose their mortgages. 
One application of the above results is that the government should build household 
confidence for the future by implementing and explaining policies to control the business cycle 
because household confidence can significantly affect the current period consumption. To 
stimulate the economy, the government needs to increase the confidence of both investors and 
households.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical model; 
section 3 presents the numerical simulation; section 4 presents the empirical analysis, including 
the empirical analysis for food expenditure, the empirical analysis for vehicle acquisition, the 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition analysis, and the foreclosure analysis; and section 5 is the 
conclusion.  
2. Theoretical Model 
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The S-Branch utility function is introduced by Brown and Heien (1972). It permits more 
flexibility in estimates of the elasticity of demand as well as complements and substitutes than 
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution function. The following is the S-Branch utility function: 









There are 𝑛 consumption goods, and they are separated into 𝑆 groups. For group 𝑠, there 
are 𝑛𝑠 kinds of goods. 𝑐𝑠𝑖 is the consumption of good 𝑖 in group 𝑠. 𝛾𝑠𝑖 is the minimum 
consumption of good 𝑖 in group 𝑠. 𝛼𝑠 is the utility weight of the consumption of goods in group 
𝑠. 𝜌 = 1 − 1
𝜎
< 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌𝑠 = 1 −
1
𝜎𝑠
,  𝜎 and 𝜎𝑠 are parameters related to the partial elasticity of 
substitution (𝜎𝑠𝑖,𝑚𝑗) between the additional consumption of 𝑐𝑠𝑖 − 𝛾𝑠𝑖 and the additional 
consumption of 𝑐𝑚𝑗 − 𝛾𝑚𝑗. 𝜎𝑠𝑖,𝑚𝑗 = 𝜎 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 ≠ 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑠𝑖,𝑚𝑗 = 𝜎 +
1
𝑤𝑠
 (𝜎𝑠 − 𝜎) 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 = 𝑚, where 
𝑤𝑠 = ∑ 𝑝𝑠𝑗�𝑐𝑠𝑗 − 𝛾𝑠𝑗�
𝑛𝑠




𝑠=1 �, and 𝑚 is the available money for 
consumption.  
Given the available amount of money to consume (𝑚𝑡) in any period 𝑡, the household’s 
one period optimal consumption is solved by Brown and Heien (1972).   




























Under the framework of the S-Branch utility function, the household first needs to buy 
the minimal amount of consumption of each good (𝛾𝑠𝑖). If there is available money left after 
buying the required minimal consumption, the household will allocate the remaining money to 
goods with different weights, and there can be both substitutability and complementarity. If the 
household cannot afford the minimum consumption in one period because of low income and 
negative asset value, the government will pay the uncovered cost of minimum consumption to 
meet needs for survival.  




𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a nominal dollar’s dynamic companion value related to both the current and future 
cash flows. When a household is pessimistic about the future, the value of 𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑡 will increase, 
resulting in a decrease in current consumption, and the adjustment will be greater for the price 
elastic consumption components. 
I apply the S-Branch utility function in this paper to analyze some major consumption 
categories, and within each category there are several components of consumption. The model is 
built on the framework of the Deaton Buffer-Stock Model (Deaton 1991). I include more 
elements to consider the mortgage default case. A household enters each period with a home 
equity of 𝐻𝐸𝑡, an outstanding mortgage of 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡  and a current income 𝑦𝑡. The home equity in 
this model can be extended to denote all household financial assets. These assets function as a 
buffer stock for a household’s smooth consumption over time. The household can tap into home 
equity by re-financing the home mortgage. The household can choose to default in each period. 
Under default, the household will consume whatever is available in the current period and have 
zero home equity and outstanding mortgage in the next period. The household needs to pay a 
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penalty of  𝑁 if it plans to borrow again in the future.1 If the household does not default, it needs 
to pay the mortgage interest and can use its home equity as a resource to smooth consumption on 
better terms. There is an upper limit of outstanding mortgage, 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 < 𝑀𝑜𝑟������, in each period. 
To simplify the model, I will not analyze the effect of prices in this paper. This is in part 
because, during the financial crisis, there were no major changes in relative prices or price levels 
for consumption goods,2 except that the relative cost of housing changed significantly. I assume 
that all the prices in the model are 1. There are two possible income levels in each period, low 
level income 𝑦𝑙 and high level income 𝑦ℎ. The evolution of income level follows a Markov 
Chain process. The transition matrix is given by: 
�𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑙ℎ𝑃ℎ𝑙 𝑃ℎℎ
� 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃�𝑦𝑡+1 =  𝑦𝑗�𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖 �. I assume that  𝑃𝑙𝑙 = 𝑃ℎℎ = 𝑃 in the model. Thus, the transition 
matrix is: 
� 𝑃 1 − 𝑃1 − 𝑃 𝑃 � 
The household’s problem at current period 𝑡 is: 
𝑈(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) = max{𝐷(𝑦𝑡),𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡)}       (2) 
where 𝐷(𝑦𝑡) is the valuation function of default and 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) is the valuation function 
of non-default. 
                                                            
1 In the case of default, the resulting credit score would lead to higher costs for a whole range of products, ranging 
































































+ 𝛽max𝐸{𝐷(𝑦𝑡+1 ),𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡+1,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1,𝑦𝑡+1)}                         (5) 
subject to 





                         (6) 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 + (𝐻𝐸𝑡 − 𝐻𝐸𝑡+1)                                           (7) 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1 < 𝑀𝑜𝑟������                                                                             (8) 
Theorem 1: 𝑷(𝑯𝑬𝒕′ ,𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕,𝒚𝒕) > 𝑷(𝑯𝑬𝒕,𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕,𝒚𝒕) 𝒊𝒇 𝑯𝑬𝒕′ > 𝑯𝑬𝒕 
                      𝑷(𝑯𝑬𝒕,𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕,𝒚𝒕) > 𝑷(𝑯𝑬𝒕,𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕′ ,𝒚𝒕) 𝒊𝒇 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕′ > 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕 
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Proof: Suppose 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡∗ , 𝐻𝐸𝑡+1∗ , and 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1∗   are the optimal current consumption and next 
period home equity and outstanding mortgage if the current home equity, outstanding mortgage, 
and income level are 𝐻𝐸𝑡, 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡, and 𝑦𝑡. Since 𝐻𝐸𝑡′ > 𝐻𝐸𝑡, 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡∗ , 𝐻𝐸𝑡+1∗ , and 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1∗   are 
affordable if the current home equity is 𝐻𝐸𝑡′ and current outstanding mortgage and income level 


































+ 𝛽max𝐸{𝐷(𝑦𝑡+1 ),𝑃( 𝐻𝐸𝑡+1∗ ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1∗ ,𝑦𝑡+1)} 
If the household choose 𝐻𝐸𝑡+1∗  and 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡+1∗  as the next period home equity and mortgage, 
 𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡∗∗  is larger than  𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡∗  in the above equations because 𝐻𝐸𝑡′ > 𝐻𝐸𝑡. In addition, the distribution 
of  {𝑦𝑡+1|𝑦𝑡} is the same for both cases because they have the same 𝑦𝑡.  
Thus, 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡′,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) > 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡). 
The second argument can be proved in the same way.∎ 
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Theorem 2: Given the current income level of 𝒚𝒕 and current outstanding mortgage level 
of 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕, if the household defaults with the current home equity of 𝑯𝑬𝒕, it will default if the 
current home equity is smaller than 𝑯𝑬𝒕. 
Given the current income level of 𝒚𝒕 and current home equity of 𝑯𝑬𝒕, if the household 
defaults with the current outstanding mortgage level of 𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕, it will default if the current 
outstanding mortgage level is larger than  𝑴𝒐𝒓𝒕. 
Proof: Given the current income level of 𝑦𝑡 and current outstanding mortgage level 
of 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡, if the household defaults with the current home equity of 𝐻𝐸𝑡, then 𝐷(𝑦𝑡) >
𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡). According to Theorem 1, 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡′,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) < 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) for any home 
equity level of 𝐻𝐸𝑡′ < 𝐻𝐸𝑡. Thus, 𝐷(𝑦𝑡) > 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡′,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡), and the household will default for 
any home equity level of 𝐻𝐸𝑡′ < 𝐻𝐸𝑡.  
The second argument can be proved in the same way.∎ 
3. Numerical Simulation 
A review of some simulation results is presented in this section. For the simulation, I 
assume that there are three consumption categories, and there is one kind of good in category 1, 
two kinds of goods in category 2, and three kinds of goods in category 3. Table 1 includes the 
parameter values in the model.  
Figure 1 is the plot of 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) and 𝐷(𝑦𝑡 ) given 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 18. According to the 
results in Figure 1, we can see that 𝑃(𝐻𝐸𝑡 ,𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 ,𝑦𝑡) is an increasing function of 𝐻𝐸𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡. The 
household will default if the home equity is deeply underwater. But, the household will not 
default if the home equity is just slightly underwater. In this case, the household would likely pay 
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the mortgage by cutting back on current consumption and keep the house as a buffer asset to 
smooth future consumptions. The extent to which they can intentionally cut back is shaped by 
the needs parameters in the S-Branch utility function. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 are the consumption plots in cases of current low income level and 
high income level when 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 18. The household will consume more in the current period if 
the home equity is greater, given the current income level and outstanding mortgage. And, the 
household will consume more if the current income level is higher, given other factors 
unchanged. 
Will the “needs” as minimum consumption levels, 𝛾𝑠𝑖, affect current consumption? 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 are the consumption plots in cases of current low income level and high 
income level with different minimum consumption. “High min.” signifies the high minimum 
consumption levels, and “Low min.’ indicates the low minimum consumption levels, which are 
60% of the original values.  The change of the minimum consumption levels will affect current 
consumption. The consumption of some goods increase, while the consumption of other goods 
decrease. This fact can be explained by equation (1). For lower minimum consumption, the 
required costs for minimum consumptions decrease, giving the household more flexibility to 
reallocate wealth across different periods and different kinds of goods.   
Overall, it is optimal for households with deep “underwater” home equities to foreclose 
their mortgages. And, the change of minimum consumption levels can affect the overall 
consumptions of each good in the current period. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
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The empirical analysis focuses on households’ consumption expenditures on food, 
including food eaten at home and food eaten out, and vehicle because food is the most important 
and necessary household consumption and vehicle is a typical and popular durable goods in 
households. PSID main family data from 2005 to 2009 are used for the empirical analysis3. I 
divide the data into two sub-periods, 2005-2007 and 2007-2009.  After estimating a regression 
for each sub-period, I contrast the household’s different consumption responses to changes in 
home equity and other financial status before and during the financial crisis. The Blinder-Oaxaca 
Decomposition is exploited with regard to the two groups to test the “Characteristics Effect” 
(changing in X’s) and “Coefficients Effect” (changing in  𝛽 ’s). The Blinder-Oaxaca 
Decomposition captures the effects on household consumption caused by the change in the 
values of independent variables, such as employment status and wealth level, versus the shift of 
consumption function. The “Coefficients Effect” captures the effect caused by the change of 𝜆, 
which is a measure of people’s expectations for the future. 
4.1. Food Expenditures 
There are three categories of food consumption in the PSID family data: food eaten at 
home (F22), delivered food (F24), and food eaten out (F25)4. For each household, the reference 
period of food consumption expenditure can be weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, or yearly. All the 
reference periods are transformed to per week for estimation. Because some reported food eaten 
at home expenditures may include delivered food expenditures given the design of the PSID 
questionnaire, these two categories are combined as the food eaten at home expenditure category. 
                                                            
3 In this paper, only the households who are interviewed in both of two sequential interviews are 
included in the sample, and the same household is defined by having the same individual head in 
the two sequential interviews. 
4 F22, F24, and F25 are PSID question numbers for the survey questions of food expenditures. 
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The food eaten out expenditure is the other broad category. Households who used food stamps 
are excluded from the sample. 
OLS regression is used for the food expenditure analysis.5 For the sub-period of 2007-
2009, the dependent variable is the change of food expenditure in a household per week between 
2007 and 2009, and the independent variables include the change in the number of persons in a 
household between 2007 and 2009, whether a household refinanced either mortgage 1 or 
mortgage 2 at the time of 2009 interview, the change of head’s employment status between 2007 
and 2009 (define  head’s employment status=1 if the head has a job at the time of interview; 
otherwise, head’s employment status=0. The change of head’s employment status between 2007 
and 2009 is the difference between head’s employment status in 2007 and in 2009), the change 
of total family income between 2006 and 2008, the change of total wealth without home equity 
between 2007 and 2009, and the change of home equity between 2007 and 2009.  
To study the likely different consumption structures, all households are divided into two 
groups: households who owned their houses in both 2007 and 2009 (all owner) and households 
who rented their houses in both 2007 and 2009 (all renter). This excludes the observations of 
those changing their occupation status. Since home owners and renters suffered different losses 
in the financial crisis, they are expected to respond to the financial crisis differently. For renters, 
the “HE” in the model can denote the overall wealth without home equity. Home owners 
experienced a larger decrease in “HE” during the financial crisis than renters did.  
                                                            
5 The PSID Core/Immigrant Family Weight in 2009 (ER47012) is used for the regression of 2007-2009 data, and the 
same weight in 2007 (ER41069) is used for the regression of 2005-2007 data. All the other regressions in this paper 
are adjusted by the corresponding PSID Core/Immigrant Family Weights. 
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Households within different age groups may have different consumption behaviors. 
Those differences are captured by the different parameter values in the model. To capture those 
differences, I further divide the household groups. 
All owners are divided into two sub-groups according to the age of head: 
Owner, age ≤ 45: home owner households in which the age of head is less than or equal 
to 45 in 2009;  
Owner, age > 45: home owner households in which the age of head is greater than 45 in 
2009; 
All renters are divided into two sub-groups according to the age of head: 
Renter, age ≤ 45: home renter households in which the age of head is less than or equal 
to 45 in 2009; 
Renter, age > 45: home renter households in which the age of head is greater than 45 in 
2009; 
To capture the possible effect of retirement, I include one more dummy variable of 
“whether head retired in 2007” for the groups of (Owner, age > 45) and (Renter, age > 45). Table 
2 is the regression analysis of the change in food eaten at home expenditure from 2007 to 2009, 
and table 3 is the regression analysis of the change in food eaten out expenditure from 2007 to 
2009.6  For the change in food eaten at home expenditure, the change in household wealth status 
and the change in employment status of head do not have significant effects, except for the group 
                                                            
6 Some outliers are deleted. (|∆ 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠| ≥ 350, or 
|∆ 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒| ≥ 270, or |∆ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠| ≥ 5, or |∆ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| ≥ 500𝐾, 
or |∆ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦| ≥ 10𝑀, or |∆ ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦| ≥ 800𝐾. In addition, observations with invalid 
variable values are also excluded. 
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(Renter, age ≤ 45), in which the change in total family income and the change in wealth without 
home equity significantly affect the change of food consumption. This result indicates that the 
underlying elasticities of food eaten at home expenditure with respect to the financial status and 
employment status of head are either low or imprecisely estimated. The change in number of 
persons in a household significantly affects the change of food eaten at home expenditure. This 
result is intuitive. The more people in a household, the higher the necessary food expenditure 
needed at home, as suggested by the consumption change of goods 𝑐11 in Figure 4 and Figure 5 
for different needs parameter (𝛾𝑠𝑖) values. The native estimated coefficient of the change in total 
family income for the group (Renter, age> 45) does not make sense, but it is only slightly 
significant (P-value=0.0921). 
In contrast with the change in food eaten at home expenditure, the change in food eaten 
out expenditure is very responsive to the financial status of the home owners. The increase 
(decrease) in home equity, wealth without home equity, and total family income all significantly 
increase (decrease) the food eaten out expenditure for home owners. For home owners with 
young heads, the change in head’s employment status significantly affects the change in food 
eaten out expenditure. If we compare the estimated coefficients in the group (Owner, age ≤ 45) 
to the group (Owner, age > 45), we can see that the households with young heads are more 
sensitive to the change in financial and employment status of head with respect to food eaten out 
expenditure than are the households with older heads. For renters, the change in employment 
status of head and the change in total family income do not significantly affect the change in 
food eaten out expenditure.  The estimated coefficient on the change in total family income is 
significant only at the 10% level for renters with young heads. 
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The negative estimated coefficients of the change of wealth without home equity in the 
group of (all renter) and group of (Renter, age > 45) are difficult to evaluate. But, the P-value of 
the estimated coefficient of -6.1950 in the group of (All Renter) is 0.0497, which is very close to 
the boundary of being significant at the 5% level. One possible reason for this result is that there 
is heterogeneity among renters in their response to the change in wealth during the financial 
crisis. The large estimated standard errors for the change of wealth without home equity in group 
of (all renter), group of (Renter, age  ≤  45), and group of (Renter, age > 45) are possible 
indicators of this reason.   
All the estimated coefficients of “whether head retired in 2007” are negative but 
insignificant. Overall, the retired people cut more food expenditures during the financial crisis, 
even though this effect is not significant. For those people who retired between the 2007 
interview date and 2009 interview date, part of the retirement effect is captured by the change in 
head’s employment status. 
To compare the possible different food expenditure responses of households to the 
change in financial status, I go back in time by 2 years and the same regression is estimated 
using the 2005-2007 PSID main family data. Table 4 presents the result of the change of food 
eaten at home expenditure from 2005 to 2007, and table 5 presents the result of the change in 
food eaten out expenditure from 2005 to 2007.7   
For the change in food eaten at home expenditure, the 2005-2007 regression result is 
similar to the 2007-2009 result. The financial status and employment status of head do not 
                                                            
7 Some outliers are deleted. (|∆ 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠| ≥ 350, or 
|∆ 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒| ≥ 250, or |∆ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠| ≥ 5, or |∆ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒| ≥ 500𝐾, 
or |∆ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦| ≥ 6𝑀, or |∆ ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦| ≥ 600𝐾. In addition, observations with invalid 




significantly affect the change in food eaten at home expenditure. But, for the food eaten out 
expenditure, there are two different patterns between the 2005-2007 result and the 2007-2009 
result. First, the estimated coefficients on the change in total family income and the change in 
wealth without home equity are not significant, and the estimated coefficient of the change of 
home equity is only statistically significant at the 10% level for the home owners in table 5. But, 
those corresponding estimated coefficients in table 3 are statistically significant at the 1% level 
or 5% level. In addition, the estimated coefficients of financial status for home owners in the 
sample of 2005-2007 are smaller than those in the sample of 2007-2009. This finding indicates 
that home owners significantly adjusted their food eaten out expenditures according to the 
changes of their financial status in the time interval of 2007-2009 during the financial crisis. 
However, they did not do so in the time interval of 2005-2007 (All t-statistics>5). An 
interpretation is that, at the interview time of 2007, the economy was performing well and home 
owners were not particularly worried about their wealth levels decreasing because the outlook 
for the overall economy and their families were optimistic. Conversely, home owners were not 
that optimistic about the future economy and their future family incomes in 2009 during the 
financial crisis, and with these concerns they significantly adjusted their food eaten out 
expenditures as a way to deal with either or both current and expected difficulties. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical effect of  𝜆 discussed in section 2. When people are pessimistic 
about the future, the value of 𝜆  will increase and the current consumptions will decrease. 
Secondly, the change of employment status of head significantly affects the change of food eaten 
out expenditure for both home owners and renters in the 2005-2007 result, while it is 
insignificant in the 2007-2009 result, except for young home owners in table 3. One possible 
reason is that many household heads lost their jobs during the financial crisis, but some 
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households adjusted their food eaten out expenditures correspondingly at the time of 2009 
interview, while others did not nor had just started to adjust their food eaten out expenditures at 
the time of 2009 interview.  
Table 5 also indicates that the change of food eaten out expenditure is more sensitive to 
the change of employment status of head in households headed by young persons than in 
households headed by old persons. In addition, the change of food eaten out expenditure is more 
sensitive to the change of employment status of head in renters than in home owners. 
4.2. Vehicle Acquisition 
Vehicle consumption is another important household consumption category, but it is 
quite different from food consumption. First, it is more discretionary in terms of level and timing 
of expenditure for each household than food consumption. Second, there is a substantial 
inventory dimension to vehicle consumption. Third, a household cannot adjust vehicle 
expenditure by continuous amount in term of whether acquiring a vehicle, while, for food 
expenditure, we assume the household can. 
For the sub-period of 2007-2009, in contrast to the age and ownership analysis, I separate 
the households into four separate categories: households who neither bought nor leased a vehicle, 
households who bought a used vehicle, households who bought a new vehicle, and households 
who leased a vehicle (either new or used) in 2008 or 2009. Multinomial logistic regression is 
used for the analysis of vehicle consumption. The dependent variable is the above categorical 
variable indicating vehicle acquisition activity in 2008 or 2009, and the independent variables 
include the number of adults in a household in 2009, (which is calculated by the difference 
between the number of persons and the number of children (under 18 years old) in a household), 
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whether a household had more than 2 vehicles at the time of the 2007 interview, whether a 
household was interviewed between June and August in 2009, whether a household was 
interviewed after August in 2009 (those two variables indicate the time of exposure to the 
contraction), whether a household refinanced either mortgage 1 or mortgage 2 at the time of 
2009 interview, head’s employment status in 2009 ( head’s employment status=1 if the head has 
a job at the time of interview; otherwise, head’s employment status=0), the unemployment weeks 
of the head in 2008, the household total family income in 2008, the household total wealth 
without home equity in 2009, and the household home equity in  2009.  
In the context of an inventory adjustment model, households that had just acquired a 
vehicle recently have reduced incentives to acquire another vehicle in the short run. To mitigate 
this effect, I exclude the households who acquired the latest vehicle in 2005, 2006, or 2007. I do 
not split the sample by head age for the vehicles analysis because the sample size of households 
that acquired vehicles is relatively small compared with the sample size of food expenditure 
regressions, and too few observations may cause regression distortion.  
Table 6 is the multinomial logistic regression analysis of the vehicle acquisition decision 
from 2007 to 2009.8 The number of adults in a household significantly affects the acquisition of 
vehicles. The more adult people in a household, the more likely a household will acquire a 
vehicle in the two years.  The households with more than 2 vehicles in 2007 are more likely to 
acquire a used vehicle. Even though it is insignificant, the estimated coefficient of “whether # of 
vehicle>2 in 07” is positive for the buy new category for home owners. This result is 
                                                            
8 Some outliers are deleted. (number of adults in 2009>6, or |𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 2006 𝑜𝑟 2008| > 600𝐾, or 
|𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2007 𝑜𝑟 2009| > 6𝑀, or | ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2007 𝑜𝑟 2009| ≥ 900𝐾, or 
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2009 < −0.5𝑀). Since some observations with extreme 2007 variable values 
are influential points for the regression, I also excluded them.  In addition, observations with invalid variable values 




contradictory to results in the durable inventory literature several decades ago. With increasing 
household wealth level and decreasing vehicle prices, more and more households can afford to 
have multiple vehicles now. Another possible reason for this result is that people in households 
with more than two vehicles have consumption preference to vehicles. The 2009 interview date 
also plays a significant role for home owners. The later the 2009 interview date, the more likely a 
household will acquire a vehicle. Compared with a household interviewed in January 2009, a 
household interviewed at December 2009 has more time to acquire a vehicle in 2009. On the 
other side, the 2009 interview date indicates the time exposure to the financial crisis. Here the 
time exposure to the recession is more than offset by a wider time window in which to report 
vehicle acquisition activity. The employment status of head at the date of the 2009 interview 
plays a slightly significant role for home owners but plays a strong and significant role for 
renters. In addition, the magnitudes of estimated coefficients of “whether head has a job in 09” 
for renters who acquired used or new vehicles are much larger than the magnitudes of 
corresponding estimated coefficients for home owners. This means that “whether head has a job” 
is more crucial for renters in acquiring vehicles than for home owners.  
Total family income in 2008 significantly affects vehicle acquisition for both home 
owners and renters. Households with more total family income in 2008 are more likely to acquire 
vehicles. Wealth without home equity plays a significant positive role for home owners who 
acquired new vehicles. A surprising result is that “Home Equity in 09” plays a significant 
negative role for home owners in acquiring used vehicles. A similar result also appears for 
renters: the “wealth without home equity” also plays a significant negative role for renters in 
acquiring used vehicles. An interpretation for this result is that, despite their poor financial 
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status, households acquired used vehicles as a less-expensive way to meet their “real” need for 
transportation.  
Similar to the analysis of food expenditure, I go back in time by 2 years and re-estimate 
the model. The 2005-2007 PSID main family data are used. This allows the comparison of the 
possible different vehicle acquisition responses of households to changing of financial status. 
Table 7 is the multinomial logistic regression analysis of the vehicle acquisition decision from 
2005 to 2007.9 Compared with the number of renters (1401) in the sample of 2007-2009, the 
number of renters (1232) in the sample of 2005-2007 is much smaller. One partial reason is that 
people are more likely to own houses in the period of 2005-2007 because it was easier to get 
mortgages at that time. In terms of which factors significantly affect the vehicle consumption, the 
2005-2007 result is very similar to the 2007-2009 result, except for two main differences. Firstly, 
the interview time in the 2005-2007 result does not play a significant role for home owners.  
Secondly, “whether head has a job” plays a greater and more significant role for home owners in 
the 2005-2007 data than in the 2007-2009 data. Conversely, for renters who acquired used or 
new vehicles, it plays a smaller role in the 2005-2007 data than in the 2007-2009 data.  
Since the variable of total family income in 2009 is not available in the 2009 PSID main 
family data 10 and family income plays a significant role in vehicle acquirement, the above 
models may have a distortion for households who acquired vehicles in 2009. To avoid this kind 
of distortion, a similar regression model with the dependent variable being the categorical 
variable indicating what kind of vehicle the household acquired only in 2008 is estimated. To 
provide a better temporal alignment with income, households who acquired their latest vehicles 
                                                            
9 The same outlier deletion rules as the ones in footnote 8 after moving the time backward by 2 years. 
 
10 PSID collects annual total family income in each of the two precious calendar years. 
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in 2005, 2006, 2007, or 2009 are excluded. The independent variables include the number of 
adults in a household in 2007, whether a household had more than 2 vehicles at the 2007 
interview time, head’s employment status in 2007 (head’s employment status=1 if the head has a 
job at the time of interview; otherwise, head’s employment status=0), the unemployment weeks 
of the head in 2008, the household total family income in 2008, the household total wealth 
without home equity in 2007, and the household home equity in 2007. Since we have fewer cases 
in the “buy new vehicle” and “lease vehicle” categories, I combine them together as a “buy new 
or lease” category. Table 8 is the multinomial logistic regression analysis of the vehicle 
acquisition decision in 2008. 11  Again, I go back by 2 years and estimate another similar 
regression for vehicle expenditure in 2006. Table 9 is the multinomial logistic regression analysis 
of the vehicle acquisition decision in 2006.12 Overall, most of our previous conclusions still hold 
in Table 8 and Table 9, but the latter can be argued as preferable and are used in the analysis to 
follow. 
4.3.       Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
In the previous analysis, we have four pairs of regressions before and during the financial 
crisis (two for the food expenditure and two for the vehicle expenditure). For some certain pairs, 
even though we identify similar significant factors, there are notable differences in the estimated 
                                                            
11 Some outliers are deleted. (number of adults in 2009>6, or |𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 2008| > 600𝐾, or 
|𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2007| > 6𝑀, or | ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2007| ≥ 900𝐾, or 
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2007 < −0.5𝑀). In addition, observations with invalid variable values are also 
excluded. 
 
12 Some outliers are deleted. (number of adults in 2005>6, or |𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 2006| > 600𝐾, or 
|𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2005| > 6𝑀, or | ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2005| ≥ 900𝐾, or 
𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2005 < −0.5𝑀, or ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 2005 < −30𝐾, or 





coefficients, including the estimated intercepts. Those differences indicate the different 
household consumption behavioral responses before and during the financial crisis. In this 
section, I will use Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition to investigate the relative roles of changing 
responses (the coefficients) versus changing values of the means. 
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition was first developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) 
and then extended by Gomulka and Stern (1990) and Fairlie (1999 and 2005) for binary 
dependent variable models and by Bauer and Sinning (2008) for nonlinear models. 
For the linear regression models in group 1(time period 1) and group 2 (time period 2),  
𝑌𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 = 𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1′ 𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 + 𝜀𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 
𝑌𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 = 𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2′ 𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 + 𝜀𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 
The mean difference between the dependent variables in group 1 and group 2 can be 
decomposed by: 
𝑀𝐷 = 𝐸�𝑌𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1� − 𝐸�𝑌𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2� = 𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1′ �𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 − 𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2′ �𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 
    = �𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1� − 𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2��
′𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 + 𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2′ ��𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 − 𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2� +
�𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1� − 𝐸�𝑋𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2��
′�𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 − 𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2� 
The first term captures the difference caused by the difference of the independent 
variable values in group 1 and group 2 (Characteristics Effect), the second term captures the 
difference caused by the difference of estimated coefficients (Coefficients Effect), and the third 




I apply the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for food expenditure and vehicle expenditure 
to estimate the above three effects. For each effect, the standard error is estimated by 
bootstrapping (reps=200).  
Table 10 presents the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition result of food expenditure between 
the sub-period of 2005-2007 and the sub-period of 2007-2009. There are no significant 
“characteristics effect”, “coefficients effect”, and “interaction effect” for food eaten at home 
expenditure, except for the weak “coefficients effect” for home owners. The low financial status 
elasticity of food eaten at home expenditure causes the insignificant “characteristics effect”, even 
though the financial status of households deteriorated during the financial crisis. The 
insignificant “coefficients effect” indicates that households did not significantly change their 
consumption behaviors toward food eaten at home, given objective measured income, wealth, 
and labor market status, under conditions of the wider financial crisis. For food eaten out 
expenditure, there is a significant “characteristics effect” for home owners but not for renters. 
Home owners suffered a bigger loss than renters both because they have more overall wealth 
than renters and specifically because house price slumped during the financial crisis, inducing 
wealth and/or collateral effects. And thus, there is a significant “characteristics effect” for home 
owners. There is a significant “coefficients effect” for both home owners and renters for food 
away from home. Both home owners and renters changed their consumption attitudes toward 
food eaten out. People became more careful in food eaten out expenditures during the financial 
crisis.  
For vehicle acquisition decisions, a non-linear technique is used for Blinder-Oaxaca 
Decomposition. Only the households that are “neither buy nor lease” or “buy new” are included 
in the sample for the decomposition.  Table 11 is the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition result for 
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the vehicle acquisition decision between the sub-period of 2005-2007 and the sub-period of 
2007-2009. The “characteristics effect” is insignificant. One main reason for this fact is that the 
mean value of “total family income in 2008” actually is bigger than the mean value of “total 
family income in 2006” and that total family income is an important factor for vehicle 
acquisition decision. The financial crisis started from the September of 2008. Even if a person 
lost his/her job at the end of 2008, the total family income in 2008 would often not be affected 
much because of unemployment compensation. In addition, for some households interviewed 
early 2009, their financial status had not fallen to a substantially worse condition. There is a 
significant “coefficients effect” for both home owners and renters. They greatly changed their 
consumption attitudes toward vehicles in light of the financial crisis. This result is consistent 
with the Consumer Sentiment Index released by the University of Michigan and Thomson 
Reuters. Figure 6 is the monthly Consumer Sentiment Index from 2005 to 2009.13 The Consumer 
Sentiment Index was relatively stable and high in the sub-period of 2005-2007 and plummeted in 
the sub-period of 2007-2009. Both the magnitude and significant level of “coefficients effect” for 
home owners are bigger than those for renters. Home owners changed their attitudes toward 
vehicle consumption on a greater level than renters did during the financial crisis.  
Table 12 is the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition result of vehicle acquisition between the 
sub-period of 2006 and the sub-period of 2008. Comparing with the results in table 11, we can 
find that there is no “coefficients effect” for renters. Renters did not really feel the painful impact 
of the financial crisis in 2008, and then they did not significantly change their attitudes toward 
vehicle consumption, given their characteristics. In contrast, home owners already felt the pinch 
of the financial crisis by 2008 because of the huge decrease in home equity and pessimism over 
                                                            




the future of housing market. Subsequently, they significantly changed their attitudes toward 
vehicle consumption. 
4.4. Foreclosure 
PSID 2009 main family data and 2011 early data are used for the foreclosure analysis. I 
generate a dummy dependent variable (Foreclosure) indicating whether a household foreclosed a 
mortgage during 2009 and 2011. This dummy variable is generated as follows: 
Foreclosure=1 if a bank or lender has started the foreclosure process on a household’s 
home at the time of 2011 interview, or, since 2009, anyone in the household has ever owned a 
main residence on which a foreclosure was commenced; otherwise, Foreclosure=0. 
Logistic regression is used, and the independent variables include head’s employment 
status in 2009 (head’s employment status=1 if the head has a job at the time of interview; 
otherwise, head’s employment status=0), the household total family income in 2008, the 
household total wealth without home equity in 2009, and whether the household home equity in 
2009 is less than 0, less than -10K, less than -50K, or less than -100K.  
Table 13 is the logistic regression analysis of foreclosure. All estimated coefficients of 
home equity dummy variables are positive and strongly significant. In addition, the magnitudes 
of estimated coefficients increase from 1.8439 for “wtr home equity in 09<0” to 2.8031 for “wtr 
home equity in 09<-100K”. These results indicate that negative home equity has a significant 





I set out a theoretical model and implemented computer simulations to capture the effect 
of home equity on household consumption expenditure. It is optimal for households with deep 
underwater home equity positions to default in their mortgages. In the default case, households 
would save money for current period consumptions if they expect poor future incomes. The 
empirical result shows the significant effect of negative home equity on mortgage foreclosures. 
Empirical analysis shows that the financial status elasticity of food eaten at home is very 
small, while the change of food eaten out expenditure and the vehicle acquisition are 
significantly affected by the financial status of households.  
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition is exploited to measure the household’s different 
consumption responses to changes of financial status before and during the financial crisis. I find 
significant “coefficients effect” for the change of food eaten out expenditure and vehicle 
acquisition. This result indicates that households changed their consumption attitudes toward 
food eaten out and vehicles during the financial crisis. In addition, home owners adjusted their 
attitudes toward new vehicle acquisition to a deeper level than renters. These results indicate that 
the decreases in food eaten out expenditure and in vehicle acquisition in 2009 were mainly 
caused by the change of household’s expectation for the future. 
More analysis can be done after the 2011 full data are released, such as the effect of total 
family income in 2009 on vehicle acquisition decisions. Future work includes the further analysis 
of vehicle acquisition, using an advanced statistics tool of classification-Random Forest. It can 






Attanasio, Orazio P., Laura Blow, Robert Hamilton, and Andrew Leicester (2008), “Booms and 
 Busts: Consumption, House Prices and Expectations,” Economica, 76(301), p.20-50. 
Attanasio, Orazio P. and Guglielmo Weber (1994), “The UK Consumption Boom of the Late  
1980s: Aggregate Implications of Microeconomic Evidence,” Economic Journal,  
104(427), p.1269-1302. 
Bauer, Thomas K. and Mathias Sinning (2008), “An Extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca 
 Decomposition to Nonlinear Models,” Advances in Statistical Analysis, 92 (2), p.197- 
206. 
Blinder, Alan S. (1973), “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates,” 
 Journal of Human Resources, 8(4), p.436-455. 
Bostic, Raphael, Stuart Gabriel, and Gary Painter (2009), “Housing Wealth, Financial Wealth, 
 and Consumption: New Evidence from Micro Data,” Regional Science and Urban  
Economics, 39 (1), p. 79-89. 
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler (1989), “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations,”  
American Economic Review, 79(1), p.14-31. 
Brown, Murray and Dale Heien (1972), “The S-Branch Utility Tree: A Generalization of the  
Linear Expenditure System,” Econometrica, 40(4), p. 737-747. 
Campbell, John Y. and João F. Cocco (2007), “How Do House Prices Affect Consumption?  
Evidence from Micro Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(3), p. 591-621. 
Carroll, Christopher D., Misuzu Otsuka, and Jiri Slacalek (2011), “How Large Are Housing and 
 Financial Wealth Effects? A New Approach,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,  
43(1), p.55-79.  
Case, Karl E., John M. Quigley, and Robert J. Shiller (2005), “Comparing Wealth Effects: The  
Stock Market versus the Housing Market,” Advances in Macroeconomics, 5(1), Article 1. 
Cooper, Daniel (2009), Essays on Housing Wealth and Consumer Behavior, Ph.D. dissertation,  




Deaton, Angus (1991), “Saving and Liquidity Constraints,” Econometrica, 59 (5), p.1221-1248. 
Dvornak, Nikola and Marion Kohler (2003), “Housing Wealth, Stock Market Wealth and  
Consumption: A Panel Analysis for Australia,” RBA Research Discussion Papers,  
Number rdp2003-07, Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Fairlie, Robert W. (1999), “The Absence of the African-American Owned Business: An Analysis  
of the Dynamics of Self-Employment,” Journal of Labor Economics, 17(1), p.80-108. 
Fairlie, Robert W. (2005), “An Extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Technique to  
Logit and Probit Models,” Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 30(4), p.305- 
316. 
Gomulka, Joanna, and Nicholas Stern (1990), “The Employment of Married Women in the  
United Kingdom, 1970-83,” Economica, 57(226), p.171-199. 
Hall, Robert E. and Frederic S. Mishkin (1982), “The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory  
Income: Estimates from Panel Data on Households,” Econometrica, 50 (2), p.461-481. 
Hofferth, Sandra L. and Sally Curtin (2005), “Poverty, Food Programs, and Childhood Obesity,”  
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24 (4), p.703-726. 
Hurst, Eric, Ming Ching Luoh, and Frank P. Stafford (1998), “Wealth Dynamics of American  
Families, 1984-1994,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 98 (1), 267-338. 
Hurst, Eric and Frank P. Stafford (2004), “Home is Where the Equity Is: Mortgage Refinancing  
and Household Consumption,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(6), p.985- 
1014. 
Iacoviello, Matteo (2011), “Housing Wealth and Consumption,” International Finance  
Discussion Papers, Number 1027, The Federal Reserve Board. 
King, M. (1990), “Discussion,” Economic Policy 11, p.383-387. 
Lambertini, Luisa, Caterina Mendicino and Maria Teresa Punzi (2010), “Expectations-Driven  





Li, Geng, Robert F. Schoeni, Sheldon H. Danziger, and Kerwin Charles (2010), “New  
Expenditure Data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics: Comparisons with the  
Consumer Expenditure Survey Data,” Monthly Labor Review, 133(2), p.29-39. 
Oaxaca, Ronald (1973), “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets,”  
International Economic Review, 14(3), p.693-709. 
Pagano, M. (1990), “Discussion,” Economic Policy 11, p.387-390. 
Skinner Jonathan  (1987), “A Superior Measure of Consumption from the Panel Study of Income  
Dynamics,” Economics Letters, 23 (2), p.213-216. 
Sun, Wei (2010), Three Essays on the Economic Decisions Faced by Elderly Households, Ph.D.  
dissertation, Boston College, Department of Economics. 
Wolff, Edward N. (2010), “Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising 
 Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze-An Update to 2007,” Working Paper No. 589, Levy 




















α1 0.80 ρ -1.10 
α2 0.10 ρ1 -0.90 
α3 0.05 ρ2 -0.80 
β11 0.60 ρ3 -0.70 
β21 0.30 𝑀𝑜𝑟������ 30 
β22 0.20 yl 20 
β31 0.56 yh 35 
β32 0.78 r 0.10 
β33 0.09 β 0.95 
γ11 1.00 p 0.85 
γ21 2.00 N 5 
γ22 3.00 
  γ31 4.00 
  γ32 3.00 
  γ33 2.00 
   
Table 1.1: Parameter Values 
 
Figure 1.1: Valuation Functions for Current Low and High Income Given Mor=18 









































Figure 1.2: Consumptions with Current Low Income when Mor=18 
 
Figure 1.3: Consumptions with Current High Income when Mor=18 



















































































































































Figure 1.4: Consumptions with Current Low Income for Different Minimum Consumptions 
 
Figure 1.5: Consumptions with Current High Income for Different Minimum Consumptions 





































































































































































































































  Δ Food Eaten at Home Expenditure ($) 
  All Owner 
Owner 
age ≤ 45 
Owner 
age > 45 All Renter 
Renter 
age ≤ 45 
Renter 
age > 45 
Intercept 4.4609*** 3.9891 4.7973** 2.3939 2.1608 2.6782 
 
(1.2934) (2.7331) (1.8836) (1.7475) (2.2168) (2.8146) 
Δ Number of Persons 20.0768*** 20.3618*** 19.1012*** 11.8060*** 16.8911*** 3.1982 
 
(2.2543) (3.7625) (2.9173) (3.3162) (2.6399) (6.5287) 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage -0.9329 1.0826 -2.3370 
   
 
(2.2376) (4.0171) (2.9353) 
   Δ Wtr Head Has a Job 0.2239 0.3158 0.3496 -1.7630 3.0441 -6.6546) 
 
(2.8813) (7.4614) (3.1999) (3.5056) (4.3465) (5.7636) 
Δ Total Family Income (K) 0.0043 0.0206 -0.0048 0.0187 0.1718* -0.1165* 
 
(0.0282) (0.0719) (0.0278) (0.0754) (0.1026) (0.0690) 
Δ Wealth W/O Home Equity (M) 0.5223 10.5239 -1.2219 2.0023 37.8505** 1.4861 
 
(2.2220) (7.2488) (2.3672) (5.3159) (18.5936) (4.3613) 
Δ Home Equity (K) -0.0120 -0.0354 -0.0042 
   
 
(0.0120) (0.0242) (0.0144) 









       Number of observations 3680 1303 2377 1349 893 456 
*, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 





  Δ Food Eaten out Expenditure ($) 
  All Owner 
Owner 
age ≤ 45 
Owner 
age > 45 All Renter 
Renter 
age ≤ 45 
Renter 
age > 45 
Intercept -2.4136*** 1.7185 -2.9723** -3.6372*** -3.2066* -4.6660*** 
 
(0.9287) (2.2329) (1.3146) (1.2622) (1.7750) (1.7092) 
Δ Number of Persons 4.2524*** 3.1992 4.0153** -0.9111 0.5110 -4.7185 
 
(1.5209) (2.6253) (1.8966) (1.8148) (2.0208) (3.4658) 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage 0.5958 -1.0669 0.3076 
   
 
(1.7286) (3.1640) (2.1009) 
   Δ Wtr Head Has a Job 1.4826 11.5471** -0.1510 3.9983 5.1993 2.4117 
 
(2.0382) (5.1996) (2.2494) (2.9494) (3.5474) (4.8392) 
Δ Total Family Income (K) 0.0600*** 0.1363** 0.0318 0.0571 0.1466* -0.0169 
 
(0.0215) (0.0544) (0.0207) (0.0394) (0.0755) (0.0283) 
Δ Wealth W/O Home Equity (M) 3.9977** 4.4893 3.9476*** -6.1950** -21.1778 -4.2671* 
 
(1.5978) (6.3017) (1.4526) (3.1543) (21.7704) (2.5441) 
Δ Home Equity (K) 0.0340*** 0.0733*** 0.0243** 
   
 
(0.0111) (0.0229) (0.0123) 









       Number of observations 3680 1303 2377 1349 893 456 
       *, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 




  Δ Food Eaten at Home Expenditure ($) 
  All Owner 
Owner 
age ≤ 45 
Owner 
age > 45 All Renter 
Renter 
age ≤ 45 
Renter 
age > 45 
Intercept 6.5871*** 11.8200*** 5.9903*** 5.0407*** 7.2654*** 1.3630 
 
(1.1687) (2.2415) (1.7643) (1.6247) (2.2906) (2.6263) 
Δ Number of Persons 16.7908*** 11.0206*** 19.4023*** 5.7790** 9.6769*** -1.5696 
 
(1.8911) (2.8939) (2.5609) (2.7130) (2.9524) (4.4193) 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage 0.8982 -1.3137 0.8104 
   
 
(2.0300) (3.3447) (2.6710) 
   Δ Wtr Head Has a Job 2.6531 11.0219* 0.5875 5.8266 8.1272 2.8148 
 
(3.1013) (6.3043) (3.6904) (5.2568) (7.0182) (6.9998) 
Δ Total Family Income (K) 0.0027 -0.0217 0.0117 0.0781 0.0529 0.0978 
 
(0.0231) (0.0324) (0.0286) (0.0632) (0.0950) (0.0766) 
Δ Wealth W/O Home Equity (M) -2.1160 -7.4804* -0.9160 4.2510 33.0704 0.9726 
 
(1.9881) (4.3095) (2.1320) (9.9290) (32.3017) (10.1358) 
Δ Home Equity (K) 0.0086 0.0415* 0.0010 
   
 
(0.0139) (0.0242) (0.0165) 









       Number of observations 3638 1352 2286 1191 762 429 
*, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 





  Δ Food Eaten out Expenditure ($) 
  All Owner 
Owner 
age ≤ 45 
Owner 
age > 45 All Renter 
Renter 
age ≤ 45 
Renter 
age > 45 
Intercept 1.1752 1.8778 0.7755 2.9219** 4.5551** 1.6792 
 
(0.8505) (1.7450) (1.2770) (1.2191) (1.8986) (1.7016) 
Δ Number of Persons 4.1056*** 1.1206 6.3553*** 0.6906 -1.4912 3.6658 
 
(1.2963) (1.6555) (1.8543) (2.2031) (2.0933) (4.7091) 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage -0.0118 -1.7337 1.4576 
   
 
(1.4664) (2.4662) (1.8750) 
   Δ Wtr Head Has a Job 5.9047*** 6.6894 5.3150** 14.0332*** 15.3740*** 11.9586*** 
 
(2.1101) (4.9085) (2.3710) (3.3980) (4.7166) (3.8360) 
Δ Total Family Income (K) 0.0354 0.0107 0.0465 -0.0114 -0.0180 -0.0052 
 
(0.0249) (0.0370) (0.0299) (0.0673) (0.1016) (0.0554) 
Δ Wealth W/O Home Equity (M) 1.9819 -3.8897 3.0427 7.7833 14.0845 6.9214 
 
(2.1879) (2.6471) (2.4671) (6.5053) (24.2271) (6.3478) 
Δ Home Equity (K) 0.0193* 0.0278 0.0168 
   
 
(0.0112) (0.0242) (0.0125) 









       Number of observations 3638 1352 2286 1191 762 429 
       *, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.




  Vehicle Acquisition Decision 
  Home Owners Renters 
 
Buy used Buy new Lease  Buy used Buy new Lease  
Intercept -2.4648*** -2.9898*** -5.5138*** -2.7256*** -5.9323*** -3.7192*** 
 
(0.2606) (0.2325) (0.4649) (0.2432) (0.6391) (0.6938) 
Number of Adults in 09 0.6354*** 0.5022*** 0.6436*** 0.5673*** 0.6030*** -0.0230 
 
(0.1001) (0.1128) (0.1457) (0.1187) (0.2317) (0.3894) 
Whether # of Vehicle > 2 in 07 0.2977** 0.1098 -0.3049 0.8896** -0.3156 -0.5735 
 
(0.1502) (0.1702) (0.3105) (0.4001) (0.8633) (0.9369) 
Interview between Jun. and Aug. 0.4028*** 0.0804 0.5652* -0.1427 0.5694 -0.1476 
 
(0.1559) (0.1760) (0.2987) (0.2156) (0.4366) (0.5238) 
Interview between Sep. and Dec. 0.6417* 0.4183 1.3331** 0.2962 0.3596 -0.2475 
 
(0.3628) (0.3603) (0.5634) (0.4179) (0.5294) (0.9973) 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage -0.1308 0.0245 0.5361** 
   
 
(0.1474) (0.1575) (0.2665) 
   Wtr Head Has a Job in 09 0.2965* 0.3644* 0.0756 1.3527*** 2.5250*** -0.0077 
 
(0.1671) (0.1896) (0.3569) (0.2084) (0.5824) (0.5225) 
Unemployed Weeks of Head in 08 -0.0075 -0.0167 0.0058 0.0101 -0.0865* -0.0160 
 
(0.0112) (0.0144) (0.0236) (0.0074) (0.0457) (0.0223) 
Total Family Income in 08 (K) 0.0031** 0.0061*** 0.0114*** -0.0028 0.0054* 0.0112** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0044) 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 09(M) 0.0179 0.3282** -0.6206 -2.8190** 0.4761 0.1480 
 
(0.1995) (0.1502) (0.4883) (1.3226) (0.3492) (0.3694) 
Home Equity in 09 (K) -0.0032*** -0.0003 -0.0002 
   
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
   Number of observations 541 386 77 396 57 45 
Number in Reference Group (neither buy nor lease) 1214     903 
       *, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
   
Table 1.6: Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of the Vehicle Acquisition Decision from 







  Vehicle Acquisition Decision 
  Home Owners Renters 
 
Buy used Buy new Lease  Buy used Buy new Lease  
Intercept -2.1079*** -2.8743*** -4.3819*** -2.4079*** -4.7217*** -6.7135*** 
 
(0.2491) (0.2340) (0.3867) (0.3089) (0.5815) (0.8638) 
Number of Adults in 07 0.4750*** 0.5741*** 0.4147** 0.6571*** 0.6547*** 0.4529 
 
(0.1175) (0.1118) (0.1674) (0.1643) (0.2385) (0.3495) 
Whether # of Vehicle > 2 in 05 0.3394** 0.1383 0.0663 1.8705*** 0.9189 2.1818*** 
 
(0.1646) (0.1681) (0.2630) (0.5525) (0.7694) (0.8330) 
Interview between Jun. and Aug. 0.0290 0.1444 0.0200 -0.1467 -0.1550 1.5309*** 
 
(0.1543) (0.1539) (0.2549) (0.2168) (0.3701) (0.5044) 
Interview between Sep. and Dec. 0.3860 -0.0772 -0.4036 0.0154 -0.0912 1.2718 
 
(0.3598) (0.3671) (0.6003) (0.3652) (0.5058) (0.8018) 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage -0.0968 -0.2750* 0.1711 
   
 
(0.1469) (0.1494) (0.2302) 
   Wtr Head Has a Job in 07 0.5034*** 0.4027** 0.4129 1.1852*** 1.9608*** 1.9854*** 
 
(0.1763) (0.1734) (0.3179) (0.2405) (0.5627) (0.6903) 
Unemployed Weeks of Head in 06 -0.0015 -0.0240 0.0211 0.0064 0.0047 -0.0154 
 
(0.0152) (0.0164) (0.0207) (0.0114) (0.0216) (0.0241) 
Total Family Income in 06 (K) 0.0052*** 0.0089*** 0.0110*** -0.0048 0.0045 0.0107** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0047) 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 07(M) 0.0463 -0.0726 0.0390 -0.8145 0.2491 -5.0090* 
 
(0.1316) (0.1305) (0.2020) (0.8122) (0.8307) (2.8960) 
Home Equity in 07 (K) -0.0033*** -0.0002 0.0003 
   
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
   Number of observations 579 512 123 370 81 51 
Number in Reference Group (neither buy nor lease) 1042     730 
       *, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
   
Table 1.7: Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of the Vehicle Acquisition Decision from 







  Vehicle Acquisition Decision 
 
Home Owners Renters 
 
Buy used Buy new or lease Buy used Buy new or lease 
Intercept -2.9430*** -3.2651*** -2.9219*** -4.0120*** 
 
(0.3153) (0.2743) (0.3303) (0.5516) 
Number of Adults in 07 0.6362*** 0.5076*** 0.2669* 0.3102 
 
(0.1153) (0.1138) (0.1457) (0.2180) 
Whether # of Vehicle > 2 in 07 0.2360 0.0128 0.9312** -0.7622 
 
(0.1743) (0.1748) (0.4137) (0.8537) 
Wtr Head Have a Job in 07 0.5258** 0.4436** 1.3816*** 1.3482*** 
 
(0.2147) (0.2152) (0.2856) (0.5053) 
Unemployed Weeks of Head in 08 -0.0012 -0.0071 -0.0028 -0.1070** 
 
(0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0086) (0.0470) 
Total Family Income in 08 (K) 0.0030** 0.0074*** 0.0001 0.0054* 
 
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 07(M) -0.2530 0.1515 -3.5766** 0.3387 
 
(0.2512) (0.1476) (1.6881) (0.8022) 




  Number of observations 371 367 243 78 
Number in Reference Group (neither buy nor lease)                  1223   904 
     *, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 











  Vehicle Acquisition Decision 
 
Home Owners Renters 
 
Buy used Buy new or lease Buy used Buy new or lease 
Intercept -1.9870*** -2.7200*** -2.6236*** -4.4401*** 
 
(0.2636) (0.2273) (0.3302) (0.5111) 
Number of Adults in 05 0.3909*** 0.3842*** 0.4628*** 0.6485*** 
 
(0.1148) (0.1093) (0.1791) (0.2488) 
Whether # of Vehicle > 2 in 05 0.2867 -0.0573 1.5406* 1.1471 
 
(0.1845) (0.1818) (0.7895) (0.8670) 
Wtr Head Have a Job in 05 0.1597 0.4533** 1.2053*** 1.3471*** 
 
(0.1981) (0.1838) (0.2754) (0.5171) 
Unemployed Weeks of Head in 06 -0.0201 -0.0372 -0.0024 -0.0482 
 
(0.0163) (0.0250) (0.0138) (0.0455) 
Total Family Income in 06 (K) 0.0060*** 0.0084*** -0.0028 0.0069* 
 
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0036) (0.0042) 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 05(M) -0.1163 -0.0368 -1.6207 -2.8432 
 
(0.2026) (0.1626) (1.3059) (2.6041) 




  Number of observations 404 457 234 79 
Number in Reference Group (neither buy nor lease)            1052   730 
     *, ** ,and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 











The decomposition for the "Δ Food Eaten at Home Expenditure"  case 
 
Home Owner Renter 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 
Omega=114 
      Char. -0.7353 0.7338 0.316 0.3292 0.3148 0.296 
Coef. 2.1229 1.4242 0.136 2.5054 2.4785 0.312 
Interaction 1.0287 1.1264 0.361 -0.0604 0.4300 0.888 
Omega=0 
      Char. 0.2934 0.8277 0.723 0.2688 0.3290 0.414 
Coef. 3.1516** 1.4323 0.028 2.4450 2.4730 0.323 
Interaction -1.0287 1.1264 0.361 0.0604 0.4300 0.888 
       The decomposition for the "Δ Food Eaten out Expenditure"  case 
 
Home Owner Renter 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 
Omega=1 
      Char. 2.7229*** 0.7074 0.000 0.1379 0.2065 0.504 
Coef. 3.4652*** 1.0290 0.001 5.9315*** 1.6009 0.000 
Interaction -0.9276 0.9723 0.340 0.1025 0.3692 0.781 
Omega=0 
      Char. 1.7954*** 0.7282 0.014 0.2404 0.3389 0.478 
Coef. 2.5376*** 1.1752 0.031 6.0340*** 1.5558 0.000 
Interaction 0.9276 0.9723 0.340 -0.1025 0.3692 0.781 
 








                                                            




Home Owner Renter 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 
Omega=1 
      Char. 0.0020 0.0080 0.805 0.0048 0.0059 0.413 
Coef. 0.0578*** 0.0169 0.001 0.0397** 0.0176 0.024 
Interaction -0.0036 0.0075 0.635 -0.0032 0.0060 0.593 
Omega=0 
      Char. -0.0016 0.0090 0.860 0.0016 0.0078 0.835 
Coef. 0.0542*** 0.0168 0.001 0.0365** 0.0178 0.040 
Interaction 0.0036 0.0075 0.635 0.0032 0.0060 0.593 
 
Table 1.11: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Vehicle Acquisition Decision between the Group 
of 2005-2007 and the Group of 2007-2009 
 
 
  Home Owner Renter 
 




   Char. -0.0060 0.0069 0.384 -0.0014 0.0048 0.763 
Coef. 0.0585*** 0.0171 0.001 0.0119 0.0188 0.528 




   Char. -0.0058 0.0079 0.464 -0.0053 0.0071 0.458 
Coef. 0.0587*** 0.0167 0.000 0.0080 0.0177 0.649 
Interaction -0.0002 0.0045 0.959 0.0039 0.0058 0.508 
 
Table 1.12: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Vehicle Acquisition Decision between the Group 








  Foreclosure 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -2.5401*** -2.5145*** -2.3233*** -2.2324*** 
 
(0.2512) (0.2458) (0.2400) (0.2470) 
Wtr Head Have a Job in 09 -0.2647 -0.2703 -0.2342 -0.2303 
 
(0.2661) (0.2656) (0.2890) (0.2869) 
Total Family Income in 08 (K) -0.0089*** -0.0094*** -0.0098*** -0.0097*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 09 (M) -0.1800 -0.2057 -0.2776 -0.3486 
 
(0.8037) (0.7498) (1.1872) (1.2380) 
WTR Home Equity<0 in 09 1.8439*** 
   
 
(0.2678) 










   
(0.3212) 
 WTR Home Equity<-100K in 09 
   
2.8031*** 
    
(0.4361) 
Number of Observations 3083 3083 3083 3083 
 













2005-2007 Owner Renter 
 
Mean Std Error of Mean Mean 
Std Error of 
Mean 
Δ Food Eaten at Home 
Expenditure 
6.244532 0.951177 5.476761 1.613807 
Δ Food Eaten out Expenditure 1.778569 0.694432 2.488948 1.180811 
Δ Number of Persons -0.040058 0.01009 0.041802 0.017481 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage 0.343514 0.009174   
Δ Wtr Head Has a Job -0.027083 0.006156 -0.030349 0.012704 
Δ Total Family Income (K) 8.266846 0.942544 4.636695 1.182416 
Δ Wealth W/O Home Equity (M) 0.071337 0.010691 0.002154 0.008082 
Δ Home Equity (K) 25.834242 1.496283     
     2007-2009 Owner Renter 
 
Mean Std Error of Mean Mean 
Std Error of 
Mean 
Δ Food Eaten at Home 
Expenditure 
3.828226 1.053546 2.702564 1.627183 
Δ Food Eaten out Expenditure -3.482011 0.778876 -3.683016 1.263092 
Δ Number of Persons -0.031809 0.008988 0.008341 0.015291 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage 0.353142 0.009277   
Δ Wtr Head Has a Job -0.082787 0.006971 -0.052925 0.014169 
Δ Total Family Income (K) 1.702945 1.122726 4.65789 1.053387 
Δ Wealth W/O Home Equity (M) -0.025376 0.013124 0.014967 0.010909 
Δ Home Equity (K) -30.026083 2.022982     
 






2005-2007 Owner Renter 
 




Buy Used 0.213186 0.009877 0.270012 0.01741 
Buy New 0.213469 0.009991 0.073553 0.010358 
Lease 0.058935 0.00596 0.023807 0.005016 
Number of Adults in 07 1.88076 0.018572 1.407644 0.024223 
Whether # of Vehicle > 2 in 05 0.228284 0.010099 0.032376 0.006576 
Interview between Jun. and Aug. 0.235495 0.010537 0.280842 0.018162 
Interview between Sep. and Dec. 0.03786 0.004591 0.074859 0.010998 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage 0.332992 0.011729   
Wtr Head Have a Job in 07 0.667753 0.012588 0.622043 0.020345 
Unemployed Weeks of Head in 06 0.669608 0.136698 2.505691 0.3932 
Total Family Income in 06 (K) 80.983056 1.726123 34.917341 1.457565 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 07 
(M) 
0.283756 0.015363 0.03565 0.005872 
Home Equity in 07 (K) 163.549398 4.365901     
 
2007-2009 Owner Renter 
 
Mean Std Error of Mean Mean 
Std Error of 
Mean 
Buy Used 0.207149 0.009782 0.229588 0.015053 
Buy New 0.180216 0.009665 0.046842 0.00843 
Lease 0.032727 0.004112 0.024395 0.005802 
Number of Adults in 09 1.890696 0.019079 1.414362 0.024807 
Whether # of Vehicle > 2 in 07 0.251551 0.010524 0.040895 0.00639 
Interview between Jun. and Aug. 0.202412 0.010159 0.267241 0.01727 
Interview between Sep. and Dec. 0.028967 0.003783 0.048078 0.007973 
Wtr Refinance Mortgage 0.331274 0.011897   
Wtr Head Have a Job in 09 0.631141 0.012773 0.588945 0.019478 
Unemployed Weeks of Head in 
08 
1.082211 0.159377 2.99611 0.340217 
Total Family Income in 08 (K) 83.699254 1.633437 37.02679 1.228909 
Wealth W/O Home Equity in 
09(M) 
0.245059 0.013354 0.047481 0.011531 
Home Equity in 09 (K) 132.048537 3.946947     
 





Chapter 2: Diminishing Margins: Housing Market Declines and 
Family Financial Responses 
1. Introduction and Literature 
In this paper, we study the factors related to family level mortgage distress and 
foreclosure in the U.S. economy, 2007-2011. Somewhat ironically, many homeowners with poor 
family financial and labor market circumstances during the boom were less likely to have trouble. 
This is because they were less likely to have access to a risky financial position in housing. On 
this basis lending in the boom can be said to have been prudent. Yet, as is well known, a family’s 
labor market and economic conditions can and do change – so many that had greater access to 
home ownership and financing in the boom were those with the greatest mortgage distress and 
became a central part of the process of contraction when housing and labor markets deteriorated. 
The implication is that mortgage credit should be based on a set of longer term measures of 
ability to pay. 
Rapid appreciation in home prices has been observed in many advanced economies. In 
Japan the housing markets for condominiums experienced a sharp rise in prices, 1987-1991, with 
Tokyo prices leading the way up quickly followed by Osaka prices. Then Tokyo prices led the 
way, precipitously downward, followed closely by those in Osaka, 1992-1995. The path of the 
rising prices and then sharply declining prices in Osaka and Tokyo, 1987-1995, has essentially 
the same shape as the Case-Shiller average of 10 major urban markets in the U.S., 1999-2009. A 
housing price boom occurred in Scandinavia: in Sweden, housing prices tripled after the mid 
1990s, with similar patterns observed in other Northern European countries. In Sweden, a boom 
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developed during 1985-1990. Subsequently, a bust occurred, 1990-1993, with a severe impact on 
the wider Swedish economy (Jaffé, 1994).15 
Various factors explaining the presence of a housing bubble include the difficulty of 
holding a short position in a heterogeneous commodity. Another strand in the literature is that of 
unfounded optimism in the value of a particular class of investment, including railroads or real 
estate. This was the premise behind the concepts set out by Irving Fisher (1933) in his effort to 
understand the Great Depression, and is more commonly recognized in the notion of Keynes’ 
‘animal spirits’ or expectation contagion (Akerloff and Shiller, 2009)16 
In Fisher’s assessment: 
“The public psychology of going into debt for gain passes through several more 
or less distinct phases: (a) the lure of big prospective dividends or gains in income 
in the remote future; (b) the hope of selling at a profit, and realizing a capital gain 
in the immediate future; (c) the vogue of reckless promotions, taking advantage of 
the habituation of the public to great expectations; (d) the development of 
downright fraud, imposing on a public which had grown credulous and gullible.” 
 
Our empirical results are consistent with housing holding a favored position as an 
investment in many U.S. markets. In particular, the resulting downturn in housing prices and 
associated delinquencies on mortgages are generally considered to be the major cause of the 
crisis in credit markets that subsequently spilled into the other sectors of the U.S. economy in the 
                                                            
15 There was a shift to more favorable tax deductions of mortgage interest, and a dramatic increase in the financing and 
construction of multi-unit housing ensued. The cycle in commercial real estate was even more acute. 
16 Work in neuroscience establishes the presence of a mirror neuron center in the brain which gives rise to human 
propensities to behave in a pattern ‘mirroring’ that of others (Iacoboni, 2009). 
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form of a Fisherian debt-deflation (Fisher, 1933). In our study, the most substantial predictor of 
mortgage distress and foreclosure is the family’s allocation of a high share of annual family 
income going to housing payments for interest, taxes, and utilities. Higher values of housing 
payments to family income -- HPI were more common in markets with strong appreciation 
during the housing boom. Our analysis suggests that lenders placed substantial reliance on 
current income rather than the longer run income needed to support repayments.   
With the belief in a high probability of realizing future capital gains, households found 
themselves in what has been referred to as the ‘double trigger’ condition (Fishback, Rose and 
Snowden, 2013). Namely, for a home financed with a substantial mortgage a fall in price need 
not create a crisis if there is sufficient income to maintain the payments. And if income falls 
substantially but the house price remains stable the house can be sold to pay the mortgage. A 
crisis arises when there is both a fall in home value below the mortgage balance and income falls 
to the extent of preventing continued payments. An addition to the double trigger condition is the 
absence of substantial net worth in other accessible categories. So perhaps it is better to think of 
a ‘triple trigger’. 
Owner-occupied housing matters for the whole economy since it is the major asset in 
many households’ portfolios and across a wide span of the life cycle (Hurst, Luoh, and Stafford, 
1998; Wolff, 2010). Housing wealth is an important determinant of consumption and saving 
behavior of households and is often correlated with savings and better overall financial 
management. For example, Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) find that housing wealth has 
substantial effects on household consumption and the U. S. economy. Dvornak and Kohler 
(2003), analyzing the data of a panel of Australian states, show that a one dollar permanent 
increase in housing wealth can cause a three cent increase in long-run annual consumption. As 
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shown by Jaffe (2004), disruptions in the housing market can have widespread and long lasting 
effects via the connection to other spending and economic activity.  
Housing services are the consumption dimension, but on the financial side, recent 
research (Hurst and Stafford, 2004; Cooper, 2009) supports home ownership as playing a central 
collateral or liquidity role (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) – in contrast to the wealth effects found 
for non-pension holdings of stocks (Juster, Lupton, Smith and Stafford, 2006) and the ‘wealth’ 
interpretation offered by Bostic, Gabriel and Painter.  In the Hurst-Stafford framework there are 
two motivations for exercising the option to refinance a mortgage. There is a traditional 
‘financial option’ allowing the homeowner to realize a net worth gain and possibly an asset 
reallocation when an existing mortgage can be refinanced at a lower interest rate. A second 
motivation for exercising the refinancing option is to tap into equity and ‘borrow up’ to support 
consumption.  
Exercising this ‘consumption option’ can lead to refinancing to both a higher loan 
balance and a higher rate of interest. This perspective has been given added support in the 
analysis of aggregate data (Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008). A substantial share of equity 
withdrawals was found to support personal consumption expenditures. Since the different 
balance sheet components are fungible, this consumption allocation is consistent with equity 
withdrawal as a supplement to cash flow to spend beyond current cash flow from income sources. 
Connected to the ‘consumption option’ is a third motivation to refinance: borrowing to 
cover cash flow requirements from home ownership that are induced by rising interest, tax and 
utility costs. This refinancing can otherwise be thought of as a ‘speculation-based liquidity 
option’. That is, refinancing for a position in housing which embodies a wider set of and higher 
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level of costs. These are costs beyond those related to normal predicted consumption, based on 
income and family composition. Rather the funds support speculative financing, based on 
expected appreciation. This appears to have played a major role in the housing market turbulence, 
2001-2009. Tapping into perceived equity gains from rising home prices can clearly be risky as 
changes in the family balance sheet are mixing with expense flows. In short, during the boom, 
families and their lenders more often took on a jointly speculative position, leading to increased 
cash flow demands to cover housing costs – and reducing liquidity other than from future 
borrowing on equity gains. In effect, the borrowing collateral was often based on expected future 
appreciation.17 
The decisions to invest in housing and hold a substantial mortgage are usually associated 
with younger households (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002), as part of a life-cycle approach to 
consumption and asset management (Campbell and Viciera, 2002; Deaton, 1991). But the 
housing boom of 1999-2005 induced many of those, even 60 years or older, to depart from the 
prior norm and to hold more housing and have greater mortgage debt than earlier cohorts. In data 
from the PSID for 1986, 20.4 percent of owners age 65-79 held a mortgage on their home. By 
2005, this had increased to 35.8 percent. A study by Apgar and Di (2006) reports that mortgage 
debt owed by older households nearly quadrupled between 1989 and 2001. In 2001, after 
accounting for inflation, the typical household headed by someone 65 or older had $44,000 in 
mortgage debt, compared with $12,000 in 1989 (Apgar and Di, 2006). This may reflect a desire 
to hold a more leveraged housing investment or it may indicate access to home equity to support 
retirement. 
                                                            
17 In part, higher marginal debt service costs were offset by interest deductibility on home mortgages, which should have 
induced families to hold a larger share of debt in the form of mortgages, even prior to 2005 bankruptcy reforms. 
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Even at the lower mortgage rates, by 2007 mortgage debt payments as well as other fixed 
expenses for insurance and taxes had become a rising share of family income compared to earlier 
periods.18 This was most pronounced in specific urban markets. With rising home expenses and a 
greater cost of home debt servicing, even elderly homeowners were in a financially constrained 
situation should there be a reversal in home prices. As can be seen in Table 1, the 1999-2005 
period was characterized by both a higher rate of home ownership and greater persistence in 
ownership than 1989-1995. When housing prices are on the rise, new demand can maintain the 
upward trend. Yet in many markets, most families that could afford the new housing and the 
related costs had already become owners, leaving a smaller pool of new potential entrants to 
further boost demand, at which point the price rise began to stall out.  
Before the 2005 U. S. bankruptcy reform, households with financial distress could 
transfer more money to pay their mortgage and could then file for bankruptcy to discharge other 
debts. After the bankruptcy reform, the cost for filing for bankruptcy increased and there were 
greater limitations on what could be discharged. Thus, households with financial problems had 
more incentive to foreclose on their mortgages. For this reason Bernstein (2008) has argued that 
the 2005 reform of U.S. bankruptcy law resulted in, or at least precipitated, the increase of 
mortgage defaults. Morgan, Iverson and Botsch (2011), using 1/1998-3/2007 state-level 
aggregate data, show that subprime foreclosures increased more in states where home equity 
exemptions are high after 2005 bankruptcy reform. Li, White, and Zhu (2011), using large 
samples of individual level mortgage data also show that the 2005 reform of U.S. bankruptcy law 
led to an increase of mortgage defaults. Possibly these early foreclosure sales were enough to 
precipitate the downward price path for housing in numerous markets. 
                                                            
18 This is parallel to the concept of the aggregate Debt Service Ratio. At lower borrowing rates the amounts 
borrowed can increase to the point that overall interest costs rise (Greenspan, 2004) 
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In line with the Fisherian perspective, Crouhy,  Jarrow, and Turnbull (2008) argue that 
banks implemented some  risky actions before the real estate bubble burst. Demyanyk and 
Hemert (2009) show that the quality of loans decreased greatly during the dramatic expansion of 
the subprime (securitized) mortgage market. On the other side of the mortgage market, 
households also may take risky positions before the burst of the real estate bubble. Campbell 
(2003) shows that people with low risk aversion would be more likely to take Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages (ARM). Some other papers (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund 2009, Coulibaly and Li 
2009, and Immerqluck 2009) also discuss the risky position of lenders and borrowers in the 
mortgage market. Since ARM rates are normally below fixed rates, the popularity of ARM 
mortgages can also be explained as a way to participate in greater housing leverage. 
Here we explore some of the themes outlined above by using the data in the longstanding, 
nationally representative Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) of approximately 8,600 
families and 24,000 individuals living within these families. For our analysis we use a balanced 
panel of families, who had home mortgages, 2007-2009. PSID data includes housing and wealth 
holdings and basic geospatial measures. New measures include data on foreclosure and mortgage 
distress added in 2009 – 2011. Our results show that specific ex ante positions in 2007 do matter 
for future mortgage payment problems in 2009 and subsequent foreclosure. Race and education 
level of head, number of people in household, year of taking the original mortgage, the rate of 
decrease in the markets included in the Case-Shiller home price index, the ratio of housing 
payments to family income, employment status in 2009, and wealth level without equity are all 
highly related to 2009 mortgage distress and subsequent foreclosure. 
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2. Net Worth, Emerging Patterns of Assets and Home Mortgage 
We review selected basic patterns of household net worth for those headed by a person 
age 65 and older and of those at midlife, age 40-49, along with age profiles of participation on 
the home mortgage market over time. In Table 2 it can be seen that over the period, 2001-2007, 
those age 65 and older experienced a substantial rise in the constant dollar value of their net 
worth. The median value of net worth rose modestly but was generally quite stable. The rise in 
net worth of families age 65-79 has been documented elsewhere.19 The younger or midlife group 
age 40-49, which could be thought of as including the ‘younger generation,’ and likely to receive 
help from the elders 20  in times of need also had substantially more net worth as of 2007 
compared to 2001. On the other hand, financial net worth, cash or that which can be readily 
converted into cash to meet contingencies that could jeopardize mortgage payments, shows no 
growth at the mean or median, 2001-2007, for those 65 or older, and, in fact, declined modestly.  
For those of age 40-49 the mean financial wealth shows no clear improvement, 2001-
2007, and the median financial wealth shows a low and declining real value, 2001-2007. Of 
some concern is that moving toward 2007 the liquid financial net worth was declining, especially 
relative to overall net worth, and is persistently low and declining, especially at the median. The 
median for this age group was persistently under $10,000 ($2007). The debt growth was fully 
observed at that time (Dynan and Kohn, 2007). As financial vicissitudes arise, these midlife 
course families had limited net liquid reserves with which to deal with negative financial 
                                                            
19 The average net worth of those age 65-79 more than doubled in constant dollars from 1984-2001 and the income 
relative to Census Needs also rose strongly for this group, especially for those in better health. See Grafova, McGonagle 
and Stafford, 2005 “Functioning and Well-Being in the Third Age, 1986-2001,” in The Crown of Life: Dynamics of the 
Early Post-Retirement Years (Jacquelyn B. James and Paul Wink, eds.) , 2006. 
 
20 See McGarry and Schoeni, 2007. 
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shocks 21 . The rise of net worth, substantially driven by home price appreciation, was 
characterized by a constant or slightly declining financial net worth. 
Age profiles of home mortgage holding among homeowners, based on the full weighted 
sample of the PSID, 1979 to 2007, are in Figure 1. The top line is for those headed by a family 
age 25-34, and just below are the families age 35-49. Both show the persistently high rates for 
those families headed by a 25-49 year old. The middle line is for families headed by a 50-64 year 
old. About half of these families held a mortgage from 1979 to the early 1990s and then the share 
of these homeowners with a mortgage rose to about 70 percent after 1999. The lowest line is for 
families headed by an individual age 65 or older. Over the period we can see a rise for older 
families from under 20% with a mortgage to about 30 % by 2007. Another reference point is the 
dip in mortgage holding in the early 1990s, a period with high mortgage rates, followed by a 
rebound in mortgage holding as rates came down in the mid and later 1990s.  
One related measure of housing and mortgage contract position is a micro level version 
of the Debt Service Ratio (DSR) maintained by the Federal Reserve Board. This aggregate index 
shows an upward movement in cash flow burden of mortgages up through 2007.22 At the micro 
level, the PSID data show both a rising and dispersed ratio of mortgage debt to family income 
(DSR). Holding a high mortgage-based DSR is one measure of a family’s housing risk. The 
expectation of additional future increases in home prices and continued employment can be the 
motivation for enduring a higher current cash flow burden. Expanding this to include all other 
                                                            
21 The 2007 value of non-collateralized debt, especially burdensome in a cash flow crisis, shows that of the families who 
hold any had a total balance averaging $21,500. See ‘Trends in Household Wealth Dynamics, 2005-2007.’ Technical 
paper Working Paper Series, September, 2009. http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Publications/Papers/tsp/2009-
03_Trends_in_Household_Wealth.pdf 
22 As noted by Alan Greenspan (2004), even with lower mortgage rates, the added mortgage value outstanding can lead 




housing related payments relative to family income, housing payments to income (HPI) provides 
another measure of housing service cost burden.  
Included in HPI are payments for interest on the first and second mortgage, and with 
rising house prices come rising real estate taxes, and along with utilities, the cash flow going into 
owner occupied housing was on the rise, 1990-2007. Retrospectively, we may want to conclude 
that these were evident patterns of ‘excess’ in the housing and mortgage market and related to 
the various mortgage quality measures reported from industry data. At the time of the upswing, 
observers could refer to stable and falling ex post loan-to-value ratios, but these were often 
driven by home price appreciation that did not persist, mostly in the markets with rapidly rising 
home prices. Edward Gramlich (2007) noted that one aspect of the 1995-2005 U.S. housing 
pattern was higher ownership rates with a wider demographic distribution. This can be seen in 
Table 1. Some families persisted as renters and others, in addition to being new or continuing 
owners took on very risky positions with non-traditional mortgages (NTM’s). Specifically, they 
(and their lenders) often chose variable rate mortgages or a balloon repayment and a short 
horizon, or a reborn use of second mortgages. The PSID panel data show these and other aspects 
of housing and mortgage decisions.  
3. The Spatial and Household Distribution of NTM’s and the Cash Flow Position  
What measures are clear indicators of a risky housing position prior to the declines in the 
market? The existing PSID data show that 2005 loan to value ratios as a measure of the 
homeowner’s leverage position are problematic. Even mortgages with a high LTV, well above a 
‘safe’ level of 80% or more in home equity at the point of mortgage settlement,23 were often 
                                                            
23 Data in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, January, 2011 indicate that high LTV’s at the point of loan origination were a rising share of new mortgages.. 
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driven downward by rapid home price increases, producing an ex post ‘safe’ mortgage. By 2007, 
the normal strong relationship between permanent income and the house value (not shown here) 
became much weaker. Going forward to 2009, some of the ex ante ‘safe’ mortgages sunk ‘under 
water’ with rapidly declining home values, 2007-2009. By 2009, most of the acute declines had 
ended, and the net equity position ex post can be observed as an outcome. Which families are 
these? Who are those experiencing this ‘collateral damage’? How strongly does the 2007 
housing payments to income (HPI) ratio, likely a better ex ante risk measure, relate to such an 
outcome? 
The share of the 2007 mortgages which were non-traditional mortgages (NTM’s) 
included variable rate mortgages (ARM’s). The ARM share was rising from 1997 to 2007, as 
shown in Figure 2.24 The rise is even stronger, given the reports were from a March to December 
field period in 2007, and that given the 2001-2004 and 1997-2001 periods are for 4 year intervals.  
There was a general rise in the share of income going to support homeowner expenses for 
all age groups. Given the position of families with respect to housing in 2007, how important are 
2007 HPI (housing payments relative to family income) and other 2007 mortgage measures in 
predicting the various outcomes in 2009 – falling behind in payments, mortgage modification, 
expecting to fall behind in the next 12 months, and foreclosure? 
4. Distress Indices and Analysis  
Here we show how these ex ante risk positions played out as the housing market and the 
wider economy deteriorated, 2007-2009. For this we have used the PSID family files in 2009 
which measure a set of mortgage distress indicators, or adverse outcomes. These range from no 
                                                            
24 The percent of ARM mortgages taken out varies with the expected inflation rate. After the 1982 inflation a very 
high share of new mortgages was adjustable as the banks sought protection from inflation risk.  
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observed problems to modest reported risk of payment problems in the next 12 months, to having 
fallen behind substantially in making payments, the need to modify the mortgage because of 
payment problems (not normal refinancing), negative home equity, and then actual foreclosure. 
Specifically, we have explored the following outcomes: 
1 Falling behind. This is based on the variable (A27F1) 1= yes, 5 = no from the 
questionnaire.  Here the measure =1 if the answer is 1, and otherwise the measure=0. 
2 Next 12 Months (A27F6) fall behind? 1=very likely, 3 = somewhat likely, 5= not at all 
likely. We define the value of this measure is 1 for the “very likely” case, 0.5 for the “somewhat 
likely” case, and 0 for the “not at all likely” case. 
3 Mortgage Modification (A27F5) (1=yes; 5=no) Here the measure =1 if the answer is 1, 
and the measure=0 otherwise. 
4 Under water 1. Here we have the cases where a dollar value of the home was reported. 
The unfolding bracket cases25 are likely to create classification problems. The ratio is (for valid 
dollar value of home value on the market – excluding bracket range values s and ‘don’t know’) 
the sum of (A24MOR1 + A24 MOR2) divided by A20 = sum of mortgage balances / house 
value (value of house if sold today). This was converted into 1-0 under water dummy variable= 
sum of mortgages/hv > 1.00 or not. 
5 Under water 2. This measure is based on the difference between the wealth with home 
equity (WEALTH2) and the wealth without home equity (WEALTH1). We define under water 
2 equal to 1 if WEALTH2-WEALTH1<0 and equal to 0 if WEALTH2-WEALTH1>0.26 
                                                            
25 Unfolding brackets refers to the use of respondent value  ranges when the respondent does not offer a dollar 
value answer.(Hurd, McFadden, Chand, Gan, Merrill, and Roberts, 1998) 
26 Measure 4 and Measure 5 differ as a function of the way in which ‘bracket’ values were treated in data processing. 
Measures 4 and 5 are used as multiple indicators of being under water – each receiving a weight of .5. 
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6 Foreclosure, 2009-2011. This is a measure of foreclosure from 2009-2011 on a mortgage 
for the main residence.  
Each of the above six measures only partly captures mortgage distress. We constructed a 
set of mortgage distress indices based on measures (1-5) to capture the overall mortgage distress 
of households, including a distress index by principal component analysis partly as a robustness 
check. Since foreclosure has relatively few cases (74 recently completed foreclosure cases, or 4% 
out of 1827 panel observations) and is quite distinct from pre-foreclosure distress, a separate 
estimation was implemented. 
5. The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Outcomes and Discussion  
The PSID had major data collections in both 2007 and 2009 (primarily over the April to 
October field period of each year). Many of the measures are as of the survey date (labor market 
status), but other important measures are for the prior calendar year (such as weeks of 
unemployment). Economic activity was falling through much of 2008, and particularly so in the 
latter part of the year and into 2009. As a result there is quite a complete capture of the 
deterioration occurring in the recession. In contrast the 2007 data refer to the calendar year 2006 
and better conditions at the date of the survey in 2007. In addition PSID has a valuable measure 
of the overall labor income of the husband and wife for two calendar years back (Yeung, 
Stafford and Andreski, 2008). From the 2009 wave, this is Income of the head 2007 and Income 
of the wife 2007. This and other 2007 wave measures allow us to explore the role of favorable 
conditions as of 2006-2007 as factors leading to a strong commitment to housing in good times 
and then the ‘triple trigger’ factors operating in bad times of 2008-2009.  
The key dependent variables are mortgage distress indices. Index 1 for Table 3 Column 1 
was constructed by summing up measure 1 through measure 5. It has 9 possible values and 
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ranges from 0 to 4. We estimated the OLS regression of this and three other variants of the 
mortgage distress index on baseline regressors and those specifically for our housing, financial 
and labor market variables. The models include several family and demographic variables known 
to predict mortgage problems (Webb, Friedberg and Dushi, 2010): age, race, marital status and 
education level of head, and the number of people in household at a given income level. We only 
include the households with male head in 2007 in the sample, and some observations with 
extreme value are excluded.  
Of direct interest are the mortgage and financial variables: the 2009 interview date (with 
after August 2009 indicating more time exposure to financial risk), whether the mortgage was 
the original mortgage, the year of taking the original mortgage, the (7/2007 – 7/2009) rate of 
decrease in the Case Shiller home price index,27 the ratio of housing payments to family income 
(HPI) in 200728. The estimated coefficient of ‘year of original mortgage’ is significantly positive 
at the 1% level. Households with more recent original mortgages as of 2007 interview were more 
likely to have mortgage payment troubles in 2009. The U.S. real estate bubble achieved its peak 
in early 2006 and then the price of real estate started to decrease from later in 2006 until 2011. 
Even controlling for HPI and other covariates, the closer to 2007 is the time of taking the original 
mortgage, the more likely does the loan reflect a risky mortgage position for both households and 
lenders because, as we now know, the anticipated future increases were not to be. This supports 
the thought that there was a build-up in overoptimistic home price expectations. 
                                                            
27 The models also included region and urbanicity, which evidenced limited correlation [to other variables] except for the 
very largest cites, for Index 1 and Index 2. The Case Shiller Index with the sharpest declines were generally the cities 
with the most rapid appreciation. 
28 Given the importance of HPI in the risk of mortgage distress, Appendix B presents a descriptive regression of HPI 
predictors as of 2007.  
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The second group of variables includes the income and balance sheet measures. The 
income of the husband and wife has been collected in summary form for two calendar years prior 
to the year of the interview. This provides an approximate measure of family income for 2007. 
Higher income of the head and wife in calendar year 2008 is strongly predictive of less mortgage 
distress. On the other hand, income as of 2007 has a modest positive relationship to mortgage 
distress as of 2009. One conjecture is that having a good income flow in 2007 was often 
conducive to the families and their lenders agreeing to mortgages by 2007 which could not be 
easily supported in 2008 and 2009, unless they had sufficient current income  In contrast then, 
2008 income of the husband and wife is strongly related to reduced mortgage distress. Measures 
of the family’s net worth and liquidity indicate that those who with thin reserves of liquid assets 
(as shown in Table 2) were often those with payment problems as the recession set in. 
Labor market status in 2007 and 2009 has an interesting relationship to mortgage distress 
in 2009. In a fashion somewhat parallel to income, and in line with the Fisher thesis, many of the 
measures of poor labor market status as of 2007 appear to be factors that prevented families from 
getting into a risky mortgage position. While the head being unemployed as of 2007 is a positive 
predictor of later distress, as reported in PSID, ‘keeping house’ (which is another term for being 
out of the labor force and often being a discouraged worker) in 2007 by the head or wife is a 
negative predictor of distress in 2009. An interpretation is that, just as low income as of 2007 
may have prohibited lenders from letting a family become overcommitted to housing, so too did 
the husband and wife being out of the labor force in 2007. In a parallel fashion, the husband or 
wife being disabled in 2007 is a predictor of less mortgage distress, while either being disabled 
as of 2009 is a strong positive predictor of mortgage distress.  
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For households in the cities where the Case Shiller home index declined more than 35% 
from 2007 to 2009, the values of distress index are significantly higher at the 1% level. This 
result may at least be the consequence of our distress index, which includes a partly mechanical 
link between a falling local housing market prices and being ‘under water’. To rule out this effect, 
we created a new index, Index 2, only using measures 1 - 3. The regression results of Index 2 are 
shown in regression (2) in Table 3. Even though the estimated coefficient of “Case-Shiller index 
decline (07-09)>=35” is not significant, it is still positive and close to being significant. (Similar 
results are found for another index built by Principal Component Analysis). This finding is 
interesting because the rate of home price declines in city is presumably independent of the 
financial situation of the individual household and its ability to pay the mortgage as reflected in 
the family-specific financial and income measures.  
Unemployment, income level, balance sheet measures, the household being in a city with 
35% or more home price decline predict likely payment troubles. Rapidly decreasing house 
prices in a city can be a signal of poor current and anticipated labor market and income levels. 
This poor prospect gives households more anticipated difficulties and greater incentives to 
consider foreclosure on their own mortgages, a type of financial contagion. Further, a large price 
decrease may cause anxiety for the household, and this by itself can shape expectations about 
ability to pay in the next 12 months.29  
The other significant predictor of mortgage payment trouble is the HPI in 2007. A high 
value of HPI is an indicator of a risky cash flow position, and is an alternative to the traditional 
index of a ‘safe mortgage’, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of .80 or less. While LTV can be 
                                                            
29 The correlation of the mortgage distress measures and reported life satisfaction was significantly negative. 
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shaped by rapid house price appreciation, if the value of HPI is high 30, the ability of the 
household to pay the mortgage can be compromised with a deterioration of employment status or 
other negative financial shocks, including a decline in the market value of the home. To assess 
the role of 2007 income and HPI, a reason both seem to matter is as follows. A high HPI implies 
a cash flow risk in its own right, but if, besides, the family was at a high level of current income, 
they are at still greater risk of moving to a lower future level and that will additionally precipitate 
repayment difficulties. 
To check the robustness of our results, we constructed two additional indices (Index 3 
and Index 4) and estimated a regression structure similar to Index 1 and Index 2. For Index 3, we 
first estimated the OLS regression of each mortgage distress measure on all the other mortgage 
distress measures and kept the fitted values of each regression. Then, applying a principal 
component analysis for the fitted values, we defined the first dimension of the PCA as Index 3. 
Index 4, built up in the same way as Index 3, except that we did not include the measure 4 and 
measure 5 to rule out the effect of house value declines on the index. The regression results of 
Index 3 and Index 4 are shown as III and IV. Most conclusions from Index 1 and 2 hold for 
Index 3 and Index 4. Overall, the results about the number of people in the household, year of 
taking the original mortgage, the rate of decrease of Case Shiller index>=35%, HPI, the head 
‘keeping house’ as of 2009, income of wife in 2008, and net worth excluding home equity are 
relatively stable across different models.  
                                                            
30 “People [in Bakersfield, California] didn’t seem to have enough income to pay for what they had bought.” Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report, p. 43.  
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6. Analysis of Foreclosure 2009-2011 
The process of foreclosure unfolds over time. By 2009 there was substantial mortgage 
distress while the number of actual foreclosures observed by the date of the interview was rather 
small and may have been part of the normal incidence of foreclosure rather than in the context of 
the financial crisis. By adding in the foreclosures reported looking back from the date of 
interview in 2011 we were able to obtain a better measure of the eventual foreclosure outcome. 
For 2009-2011 (date of interview) a total of 74 foreclosures (of 1,827 panel observations) were 
reported as having at least been started.  Similar to the model of Index 1, a model with Index 5, 
Foreclosure, 2009-2011, is estimated. We have the results for the main variables of interest in 
Table 4. 
The date of interview as of 2009 becomes less important, given the wider time window to 
observe the adverse outcome. For Case-Shiller index and housing payments to income (HPI), the 
predictive power for a foreclosure is comparable to the results for Indices 1-4, and the recent (as 
of 2007) mortgages are those most likely to end up in foreclosure. The relationship with income 
in the different years is of interest. Greater income of the head and wife as of 2008 predicts a 
lower foreclosure probability. In contrast, greater income by the head and wife in 2007 before 
the recession predicts a greater risk of foreclosure, 2009-2011. It seems as if ample current 
income as of 2007 led the families and their banks to commit to more housing, while more 
income as of 2008 when the recession was coming in provided the cash flow to reduce the 
subsequent foreclosure risk.   
For African American families a high current income is likely to have larger transitory 
component than for a white family (Friedman, 1957). Specifically, for those African-American 
mortgage holders with total family income in the 75-79th percentile as of 2006 (2007 survey), 55% 
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had income less than the 75th percentile in 2008 (2009 survey), and 27 percent had moved up.31 
In comparison, while 46 percent of white and Asian families had moved down below the 75th 
percentile 42 percent had moved up. While downward income mobility across the two years was 
common, this was more the case for African-American families. As such, lending based on 
current income will lead to more repayment problems for any group with a greater risk of 
downward income mobility. 
Adverse labor market measures for the husband as of 2007 show a positive relation to 
foreclosure as of 2008-2011. For the wife, however, a weak labor market connection as of 2007 
is somewhat parallel to the income measure for the year 2007. That is, a wife being unemployed, 
retired, disabled or keeping house (out of the labor force) as of 2007 has a negative relation to 
the later foreclosure outcome. This suggests that a weak labor market connection of the wife as 
of 2007 led families and lenders to be more cautious about mortgage commitments. Then, as of 
2008-09, most negative labor market indicators for both the husband and wife are positive 
predictors of foreclosure. The exception is the modest positive relation between foreclosure and 
weeks worked of the head as of 2008, possibly a labor supply response to foreclosure risk.32 
7. Conclusion 
A main reason for mortgage payment troubles of households in 2009 can be found in the 
prior mortgage decisions. Often expecting further price appreciation or responding to a positive 
family labor market and income circumstance, ex ante, homeowners allocated too much of their 
family income to support house payments and put themselves in a risky position. From our 
                                                            
31 A similar argument could apply to wealth – a high value for an African-American family may include a larger 
transitory component. 
32 The relation between foreclosure and the demographic variables are similar to those for Indices 1-4. Net of the 
reported covariates region, city size, age of head had little relationship to foreclosure.  
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perspective, the strong connection of the high cash flow service burden on housing, from debt 
service and other housing costs, can inform future assessments of rising risk in residential 
housing. Committing a high share of current family income to housing, or substantial mortgage 
borrowing relative to current family income is an indication that the family expects a price rise to 
reward their current payment burden or that they simply have housing which is likely beyond 
their means. Continued appreciation was often not borne out in 2007-2009, nor was the income 
needed to support the housing commitment, and both of these may re-occur in the future.  
In the Dodd-Frank bill the “ratios of total monthly debt to monthly income or alternate 
measures of ability” to pay should be considered when determining whether a mortgage is a 
"qualified mortgage" or not.33 At a minimum, to develop market measures to assess the quality 
of existing mortgages, a measure of cash flow commitments to housing should be monitored 
along with the traditional index of loan to value (LTV). Given the heterogeneity across housing 
markets, the HPI ratio should be measured for individual urban housing markets such as those in 
the Case-Shiller index, using micro data such as the PSID, the Survey of Consumer Expenditures 
or the Survey of Income and Program Participation. An even more readily available measure is 
the price of homes relative to income. This ratio doubled during the recent price cycle in United 
Kingdom housing. Such a measure could serve as an early warning indicator and lead to a 
disaggregated geospatial assessment, looking at both the income of families and the cash flow 
for debt service and other costs to support their housing position. 
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1989 - 1995 -- All Respondents Ages 30-60 
 Don't Own 1989 Own 1989 Total 
Don't Own 1995 25.66% 4.74% 30.40% 
Own 1995 10.74% 58.86% 69.60% 
Total 36.40% 63.60% 100% 
 
1999 - 2005 -- All Respondents Ages 30-60 
 Don't Own 1999 Own 1999 Total 
Don't Own 2005 22.39% 5.07% 27.47% 
Own 2005 10.81% 61.72% 72.53% 
Total 33.20% 66.80% 100% 
 





AGE 2001 2003 2005 2007 
65+     
NW Mean 463.5 486.4 488.5 575.5 
NW Median 218.5 204.3 208.1 237.1 
FNW Mean 238.8 255.0 222.8 237.7 
FNW 
Median 48.7 48.4 42.5 42.0 
40-49     
NW Mean 267.8 257.4 306.5 367.2 
NW Median 82.3 73.8 81.7 90.0 
FNW Mean 123.5 103.5 121.7 100.1 
FNW Medn 9.7 8.0 8.2 8.0 
 
Table 2.2: Household Net Worth (NW) and Financial Net Worth (FNW), 2001-2007 ($2007) 
NW: These are the same definitions as used in “Wealth Dynamics of American Families, 1984-1994,” 
(Erik Hurst, Ming Ching Luoh and Frank P. Stafford), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998: 1, p. 













  Index 1 Index 2 Index 3 Index 4 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Interviewed after August 2009 0.1669** 0.1744*** 0.0128 0.0551*** 
 
(0.0749) (0.0605) (0.0409) (0.0175) 
     MORTGAGE AND MARKET MEASURES 
    Whether original mortgage (0/1) 0.0081 -0.0194 0.0289* -0.0055 
 
(0.0322) (0.0260) (0.0175) (0.0075) 
Year of original mortgage 0.0183*** 0.0127*** 0.0079*** 0.0035*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0009) 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=15% but 
<35% 0.0142 0.0150 -0.0013 0.0053 
 
(0.0686) (0.0554) (0.0374) (0.0161) 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=35 0.2348*** 0.0869 0.1847*** 0.0279 
 
(0.0738) (0.0596) (0.0402) (0.0173) 
Housing payment ratio (HPI) 1.4105*** 1.0362*** 0.5513*** 0.2724*** 
 
(0.1493) (0.1205) (0.0814) (0.0349) 
     INCOME AND BALANCE SHEET ($1,000) 
    Income head 2007 (M) 0.5606 0.4086 0.2489 0.1575 
 
(0.4736) (0.3824) (0.2582) (0.1109) 
Income head 2008 (M) -0.8364* -0.6820* -0.2911 -0.2377** 
 
(0.4662) (0.3764) (0.2541) (0.1091) 
Income wife 2007 (M) 1.8557 1.1984 0.9078 0.3506 
 
(1.1545) (0.9322) (0.6293) (0.2702) 
Income wife 2008 (M) -2.4862** -1.6190* -1.2021** -0.4888** 
 
(1.0397) (0.8395) (0.5667) (0.2433) 
Number of people in household  0.0332** 0.0386*** -0.0013 0.0110*** 
 
(0.0136) (0.0109) (0.0074) (0.0032) 




(0.0570) (0.0460) (0.0311) (0.0133) 
Value of checking and saving 2007<=2000 0.0841** 0.0860*** 0.0112 0.0317*** 
 
(0.0393) (0.0318) (0.0214) (0.0092) 
LABOR MARKET STATUS 
    Laid off head 2007 0.2404 0.2980 -0.0458 0.0872 
 
(0.2688) (0.2170) (0.1465) (0.0629) 
Laid off head 2009 0.2612 0.2229 0.0738 0.0885** 
 
(0.1902) (0.1536) (0.1037) (0.0445) 
Unemployed head 2007 0.2407** 0.2142** 0.0536 0.0440 
 
(0.1154) (0.0932) (0.0629) (0.0270) 
Unemployed head 2009 0.4255*** 0.3667*** 0.1134*** 0.1208*** 
 
(0.0747) (0.0603) (0.0407) (0.0175) 
Disabled head 2007 -0.2133 -0.1289 -0.1043 -0.0196 
 
(0.1719) (0.1388) (0.0937) (0.0402) 
Disabled head 2009 0.4692*** 0.4497*** 0.0706 0.1372*** 
 
(0.1518) (0.1226) (0.0828) (0.0355) 
Out of labor force head 2007 -0.7037** -0.5323** -0.2470 -0.1592** 
 
(0.2893) (0.2336) (0.1577) (0.0677) 
Out of the labor force head 2009 0.7598*** 0.5534*** 0.2798** 0.1465** 
 
(0.2613) (0.2110) (0.1424) (0.0612) 
Laid off wife 2007 0.2172 0.1143 0.1251 0.0226 
 
(0.1748) (0.1412) (0.0953) (0.0409) 
Laid off wife 2009 0.5942*** 0.5528*** 0.1254 0.1616*** 
 
(0.2184) (0.1764) (0.1191) (0.0511) 
Unemployed wife 2007 0.0494 0.0324 0.0305 -0.0027 
 
(0.1638) (0.1323) (0.0893) (0.0383) 
Unemployed wife 2009 0.0925 0.0513 0.0574 0.0176 
 
(0.1099) (0.0887) (0.0599) (0.0257) 
Disabled wife 2007 -0.3902*** -0.2690** -0.1789** -0.0906*** 
 
(0.1469) (0.1186) (0.0801) (0.0344) 
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Disabled wife 2009 0.4331*** 0.4220*** 0.0657 0.1317*** 
 
(0.1545) (0.1248) (0.0842) (0.0362) 
Out of labor force wife 2007 -0.0779 -0.0171 -0.0745** -0.0117 
 
(0.0638) (0.0515) (0.0348) (0.0149) 
Out of labor force wife 2009 -0.0708 -0.0622 -0.0136 -0.0143 
 
(0.0689) (0.0556) (0.0375) (0.0161) 
Retired head 2007 -0.1464 -0.1247 -0.0399 -0.0419* 
 
(0.1072) (0.0866) (0.0585) (0.0251) 
Retired wife 2007 0.0568 0.0360 0.0265 0.0076 
 
(0.1221) (0.0986) (0.0665) (0.0286) 
No wife 2007 -0.0404 0.0743 -0.1227** 0.0210 
 
(0.0967) (0.0781) (0.0527) (0.0226) 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND EDUCATION 
    African American (0/1) 0.1892*** 0.1268*** 0.0791*** 0.0330*** 
 
(0.0457) (0.0369) (0.0249) (0.0107) 
Some college (0/1) -0.1378*** -0.1076*** -0.0488* -0.0332*** 
 
(0.0475) (0.0384) (0.0259) (0.0111) 
Graduate school (0/1) -0.1337** -0.1009** -0.0554 -0.0334** 
 







(8.0013) (6.4606) (4.3612) (1.8727) 
Number of observation 1921 1921 1921 1921 
Note: 
    Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 
   *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 





Interviewed after August 2009 0.0216 
 
(0.0250) 
MORTGAGE AND HOME FINANCIAL MEASURES 
 Whether original mortgage (0/1) -0.0112 
 
(0.0097) 
Year of original mortgage 0.0022* 
 
(0.0012) 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=15% but <35% 0.0072 
 
(0.0205) 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=35 0.0614*** 
 
(0.0220) 
Housing payment ratio  0.1655*** 
 
(0.0452) 
INCOME AND BALANCE SHEET 
 Income head 2007 (M) 0.2986** 
 
(0.1454) 
Income head 2008 (M) -0.2786* 
 
(0.1435) 
Income wife 2007 (M) 0.3714 
 
(0.3444) 
Income wife 2008 (M) -0.4947 
 
(0.3105) 
Number of people in household  0.0027 
 
(0.0041) 
wealth without equity 2007<0 0.0676*** 
 
(0.0171) 





5,000<wealth without equity 2007<=10,000 -0.0420** 
 
(0.0209) 
50,000<wealth without equity 2007<=79,000 -0.0341** 
 
(0.0172) 
wealth without equity 2007>79,000 -0.0119 
 
(0.0127) 
value of checking and saving 2007<=2000 0.0007 
 
(0.0119) 
LABOR MARKET STATUS 
 Laid off head 2007 0.1112 
 
(0.0791) 
Laid off head 2009 0.0070 
 
(0.0560) 
Unemployed head 2007 0.0986*** 
 
(0.0350) 
Unemployed head 2009 0.0424* 
 
(0.0224) 
Disabled head 2007 0.1158** 
 
(0.0514) 
Disabled head 2009 0.0937** 
 
(0.0463) 
Out of labor force head 2007 -0.1119 
 
(0.0852) 
Out of labor force head 2009 0.1348* 
 
(0.0771) 
Laid off wife 2007 0.0222 
 
(0.0534) 
Laid off wife 2009 0.1636** 
 
(0.0643) 





Unemployed wife 2009 0.0292 
 
(0.0329) 
Disabled wife 2007 -0.0765* 
 
(0.0433) 
Disabled wife 2009 0.0406 
 
(0.0457) 
Out of labor force wife 2007 -0.0399** 
 
(0.0192) 
Out of labor force wife 2009 -0.0083 
 
(0.0210) 
Retired head 2007 0.0135 
 
(0.0320) 
Retired wife 2007 -0.0494 
 
(0.0367) 
No wife 2007 -0.0155 
 
(0.0290) 
Work weeks head 2008 0.0012** 
 
(0.0006) 
Work weeks wife 2008 -0.0008* 
 
(0.0005) 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND EDUCATION 
 African American (0/1) 0.0246* 
 
(0.0137) 
Some college (0/1) -0.0147 
 
(0.0144) 








Number of observations 1827 
Note: 
 Included variables but not reported are: age categories, city size, 
region, and some labor market status measures such as student and 
retired which bore no relationship to the outcome. Available upon 
request. 
Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 
 *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
 























Figure 2.1: Percent of Home-owning Families Holding a Mortgage 















































2005-2007 2001-2004 1997-2000 Before 1997
Year of Origin Obtaining 1st Mortgage 





  Mean Std Dev 
Interviewed after August 2009 0.044248 0.205699 
Whether original mortgage (0/1) 0.500781 0.50013 
Year of original mortgage 2003.02 4.115522 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=15% but 
<35% 
0.113483 0.317264 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=35 0.107756 0.310153 
Housing payment ratio (HPI) 0.191067 0.111436 
Income head 2007 (M) 0.064306 0.060464 
Income head 2008 (M) 0.06426 0.06115 
Income wife 2007 (M) 0.029203 0.032854 
Income wife 2008 (M) 0.030245 0.035684 
Number of people in household  3.19417 1.328097 
Wealth without equity 2007<0 0.141593 0.348723 
Value of checking and saving 2007<=2000 0.291515 0.454578 
Laid off head 2007 0.003123 0.055814 
Unemployed head 2007 0.006247 0.07881 
Retired head 2007 0.017699 0.13189 
Disabled head 2007 0.047371 0.212487 
Keeping house head 2007 0.014055 0.117749 
No wife 2007 0.020302 0.141068 
Laid off wife 2007 0.003644 0.060271 
Unemployed wife 2007 0.004685 0.068305 
Retired wife 2007 0.007288 0.08508 
Disabled wife 2007 0.004685 0.068305 
Keeping house wife 2007 0.00885 0.093679 
Laid off head 2009 0.021864 0.146276 
Unemployed head 2009 0.016137 0.126037 
Disabled head 2009 0.015096 0.121968 
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Keeping house head 2009 0.148881 0.356064 
Laid off wife 2009 0.14836 0.355549 
Unemployed wife 2009 0.058824 0.235355 
Disabled wife 2009 0.025508 0.157702 
Keeping house wife 2009 0.077564 0.267554 
African American (0/1) 0.155648 0.362616 
Some college (0/1) 0.479958 0.499728 
Graduate school (0/1) 0.1114 0.314709 
 
























Whether original mortgage (0/1) 0.0066 
 
(0.005) 
Year of original mortgage 0.0042*** 
 
(0.0006) 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=15% but <35% 0.0235*** 
 
(0.0078) 
Case-Shiller index decline (07-09) >=35 0.0484*** 
 
(0.0081) 
wealth without equity 2007<0 0.0143* 
 
(0.0081) 
0<wealth without equity 2007<=5,000 0.048*** 
 
(0.0115) 
5,000<wealth without equity 2007<=10,000 -0.0017 
 
(0.0114) 
50,000<wealth without equity 2007<=79,000 -0.0251*** 
 
(0.0093) 
wealth without equity 2007>79,000 -0.02*** 
 
(0.0063) 
African American (0/1) -0.0099 
 
(0.0069) 
Some college (0/1) -0.0158*** 
 
(0.0056) 
Graduate school (0/1) -0.0125 
 
(0.009) 





355<Occupation Code<=599 -0.0025 
 
(0.0066) 
Number of observation 1915 
Note: 
 Numbers in the parentheses are the standard 
deviations. 
 *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
 


















Chapter 3: Stock Market Participation: Responses Before and 
During the Great Recession 
1. Introduction 
The decision to own or not to own stocks is a part of a wider decision of how to structure 
the household portfolio.  How people allocate their portfolios affects wealth accumulation. 
People with similar active saving rates may end up with very different wealth levels due to 
differing returns on their investments. Moreover, the shift toward defined contribution (DC) 
pension plans has created a reality where individuals are given more responsibility for 
investment choices.  The quality of such decisions bears heavily on the adequacy of financial 
preparedness for retirement. Many of those individuals under age 65 cashed in substantial 
amounts of their defined contribution pension plans in both the 2000-2001 and 2008-2009 
recessions (Bridges and Stafford, 2012). Here we set out an assessment of the decisions of U.S. 
households with respect to their non-pension holdings of stocks, 2007-2009. Studying what 
influences the decision to invest in stocks may help in understanding whether such transfer of 
responsibility in pension allocations and encouraging wider non-pension ownership is well 
justified or can be improved by better knowledge on the part of households. 
During the 1990’s, stock ownership rates experienced substantial growth (Poterba 2001). 
On a wide definition to include pension holding, participation grew from about 30 percent up to 
50 percent. At the same time there were considerable developments in the factors that might have 
potentially fueled this growth. Among such factors were the decreasing participation costs and 
the booming stock market. Stock market participation costs comprise a broad set of categories 
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that include out-of-pocket costs -- brokerage commissions, sign-up fees, costs of gathering 
information -- and perceived costs related to overcoming investor inertia. During the 1990’s, a 
reduction in these costs can be linked to a number of factors (Guiso et al. 2003). First, a shift 
toward DC plans contributed to increased awareness of stocks as an investment option and 
provided opportunities for learning about how to participate in the stock market. Second, with 
increased computer usage and the introduction of online trading, the world of stock trading 
became a click away (Bogan 2004). Third, proliferation of mutual funds provided low-cost 
access to diversified portfolios. Finally, advertisement and financial news and advice abounded 
in the media during periods of stock market gains. 
Another factor at work or being shaped by increased participation during the 1990s was 
an unprecedented run-up in the stock market. From 1995 through 1999, the S&P 500 index rose 
at 22 percent a year.  The prolonged period of high returns might have affected people’s beliefs 
about both greater future expected returns (Dominitz and Manski, 2011) and reduced riskiness of 
stocks, leading to higher stock ownership rates. In the 1960’s a parallel increase in the 
participation rate occurred during the rise in stock market valuations. The share of families 
participating rose from 16% in 1962 to 21% in 1963 and 1964 (Survey of Consumer Finances 
1964). So, higher returns can be both a cause of and result of increased participation. Yet, it may 
not be the new participants, but rather changes in the amounts held by the existing participants 
that shapes more of the market movement. 
After some exodus from the stock market through reduced DC pension plan participation 
and withdrawals from accumulated balances after 9/11, including some very sizable withdrawals, 
participation increased once again, 2003-2007, only to fall again in 2008-2009. Data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on non-pension holdings of stocks indicate that the 
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percent of families owning stock declined after 2001. Specifically, while as of 2001, 30.2 percent 
of families held non-pension equities, as of 2003 this had declined to 26.8 percent and then down 
to 24.4 percent as of 2005 and 24.1 percent in 2007 (Gouskova and Stafford, 2009).   
In this paper we study stock ownership using the PSID with a focus on dynamics between 
2007 and 2009.34 How did participation responses vary by different age and education groups 
and to what extent did some families seek to restructure their portfolios during the on-going 
financial crisis of 2008-2009? How different are the patterns of stock market participation and 
adjustment, 2007-2009, compared to 2005-2007? Notably, which families remained active in the 
stock market – both buying and selling – and which families simply ceased to participate entirely? 
Related to their changing positions in the stock market, which families shifted their holdings into 
lower risk and highly liquid assets? Which families continued to participate even as the market 
was declining? What amounts were taken out or added to their stock market holdings? Which 
families experienced capital losses? 
Knowing who were the people exiting the stock market during the recessionary period is 
important for understanding what factors shape people’s decision to participate in the stock 
market.  Of particular concern is that, especially during periods of strong expected returns, lower 
costs might have invited entry among less well off and less financially sophisticated families. 
Then later one can see them exit, bearing losses as the market fell. In the analysis we answer 
whether exit among such groups was relatively high compared to others. Also, do the patterns of 
reallocation differ by age? During the market boom, 1994-1999, participation persisted at 
relatively high rates among older households, a pattern which departed from the normal life 
cycle asset allocation model (Campbell and Viciera, 2002). What was the age pattern of 
                                                            
34 The data in PSID are regarded as representative of family net worth holdings up to about the 98th percentile (Juster, 
et.al, 1999). The issue of the validity of the measures in the various household measures has been studied only indirectly, 
such as by comparisons with alignment with Flow of Funds data (Antoniewicz, 2000). 
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participation changes, 2007-2009? 
Compared with cross-section data, the PSID panel data allow better understanding of 
participation dynamics, providing information on who entered and exited the stock market 
during the period. The longitudinal nature of the data also allows some accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity among the households. The analysis is based on comparison of stock 
market participation patterns conditional on demographic and economic factors. The comparison 
is done in the framework of the logit model and related models.  We also present basic 
descriptive patterns as part of the data analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 A we review the static mean-variance 
portfolio theory and discuss implications that provide a basis for our empirical analysis. Section 
2 B assesses the implications of the life cycle asset allocation theory. These provide expected 
patterns of allocation between stocks and other assets in response to a perceived increase in the 
riskiness of equity investments. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, beginning with overall 
descriptive statistics in Section 3 A and 3 B. Empirical analysis is provided in Section 3 C. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Implications of Asset Allocation Theories 
  A. Static Mean-Variance Theory  
To begin, the stock market participation decision can be set out in the framework of the 
static mean-variance portfolio choice model developed by Markovitz. The exposition is based on 
Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli and Campbell 2002. Suppose there are two assets available to an 
investor. One asset is riskless with return Rf. The other is risky with expected return 𝐸𝑅𝑟 and 
variance 𝜎𝑟2. Further assume that investor’s preferences are quadratic in wealth with risk aversion 
to variance of k. The investor’s problem is to allocate wealth between the two assets, i.e. to 
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decide what share of wealth should be in risky assets. The solution to this problem is given by 
the following: 
 
Assuming 𝐸𝑅𝑟 − 𝑅𝑓 > 0 , the risk averse investor still always participates in the stock 
market (λ > 0)  no matter how risk averse. However, in reality, to participate in the stock market 
requires knowledge of how to invest in equity, paying commissions and sign up fees as well as 
time to monitor the investment. Given such costs, suppose these constitute fixed entry and 
participation costs, C. The consumer participates in the stock market if utility of participation is 
higher than utility of non-participation. 
𝐸�𝑈�𝑅𝑓𝑊 + 𝜆𝑊�𝑅𝑟 − 𝑅𝑓� − 𝐶�� > 𝑈�𝑅𝑓𝑊� 
Let 𝑅𝑓𝑊 + 𝜆𝑊�𝑅�𝑟 − 𝑅𝑓�  be a certainty equivalent level of final wealth with 𝑅�𝑟 being 
certainty equivalent return on stocks. 𝑅�𝑟 is between 𝑅𝑓 and 𝐸𝑅𝑟.  A consumer will participate in 
the stock market if 𝜆𝑊�𝑅�𝑟 − 𝑅𝑓� > 𝐶. Adding fixed entry costs implies that households with 
wealth below a threshold level that makes participation worthwhile will not hold equity. 
Lowering C increases the net benefit from participation in the stock market—the difference 
between the interest cash flow from participating in the stock market, the left hand side of the 
inequality, and the participation cost, C35.  
A decrease in C is predicted to induce entry into the stock market among some lower 
wealth households.  On the other hand, an increase in perceived riskiness or a reduced mean 
expected return leads to a smaller utility equivalent for all households, and those operating just 
                                                            
35 The fixed cost may be higher for lower wealth families since it can include the need to review the investment 
outcomes and higher education families generally hold more wealth. For older families the fixed costs of participation 












past the fixed costs threshold will have incentives to cease participation. Households that for 
some reason have chosen not to participate and for whom participation costs are not binding 
might not be strongly encouraged by the effect of decrease in participation costs. A decline in 
returns or increased riskiness should not induce non-participation for those whose initial position 
is well above the fixed cost threshold. Of course the extent of their allocation to stocks will be 
declining with perceived increases in risk and lower returns. That is, shocks to expectations 
about future returns or riskiness of stocks are likely to affect broader groups of households by 
moving the threshold wealth level as well as changing optimal share, 𝜆.   
In particular, the optimal share increases when 𝜎𝑟2 decreases and/or higher returns are 
expected.  In addition, an increase in expected return and/or decrease in 𝜎𝑟2  increases the 
certainty equivalent premium,  𝑅�𝑟 − 𝑅𝑓. Thus, an increase in 𝐸𝑅𝑟 and/or decrease in 𝜎𝑟2 should 
result in entry among the households previously restricted by participation costs but also raise the 
extent of participation among wealthier households as the higher optimal share relates to higher 
level of participation. 
Compared to the situation with changing costs, in the case of changing expected returns 
we might expect more active response among wealthier households, as the benefits of 
participation increase proportionally to wealth level and thus it is costly, in absolute terms, not to 
adjust their portfolios for households with substantial level of financial wealth. These 
considerations suggest that observing the dynamics in participation patterns can be potentially 
informative about the underlying factors.  
B. Extensions 
Going from the basic framework set out above there are life-cycle extensions, offering 
insight into the age pattern to the portfolio composition. In addition there is emerging strong 
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evidence of education and knowledge as factors leading to a better understanding of financial 
markets (Kĕdzi and Willis, 2011).  As a minimum the simple framework above can suggest that 
better education and higher financial literacy lower the fixed costs of participation. As well, the 
expected returns may be higher and better ability to avoid investing pitfalls should provide a 
basis for expecting education to matter both for ownership and ability to navigate market 
fluctuations. One simple extension of the model is to think of a series of investment plans. Each 
has some fixed cost. For the initial participation decision the cost is set out as above, namely C. 
For future periods there will still be a fixed cost per period, P. This should generally be lower 
than C, but still involves an assessment of the family circumstance and market conditions. This 
implies that there are recurring costs, independent of the dollars invested, and this can also lead 
to non-participation. 
According to the theoretical life cycle models (Campbell and Vicirea, 2002) younger 
households should be willing to participate in the stock market as they possess an implicit stock 
of another asset — human capital. The lower rates of participation among young households are 
generally attributed to borrowing constraint and low levels of buffer stock cash-on-hand as 
young households likely to be faced with a number of financial arrangements such as mortgage 
payments, or private education for children (Deaton, 1992). With participation costs and low 
financial wealth, investing in stocks can be not worthwhile for young families.   
Later in the life cycle, financial wealth accumulates while human capital declines.  The 
latter leads to adjustment in the optimal share allocated to the risky assets — the portfolio gets 
tilted away from risky assets given a smaller balance of remaining discounted earnings from 
human capital. This implication of the life cycle model is consistent with popular advice from 
financial planners that with age the stock exposure should be reduced. It is also consistent with 
95 
 
empirical evidence that indicates that participation in equities markets normally declines in older 
age.     
On the other hand, shocks to expected returns could have a substantial effect on both the 
participation decision and extent of holdings among the older households. In particular, the 
expectations of reduced returns make investment in equities less attractive and may lead to an 
earlier shift away from the stock market among these households. Irrational expectations about 
future returns can affect all groups. Without data on expected returns, it may not be obvious if 
certain socio-demographic groups are swept away by beliefs that future returns are especially 
good or especially poor. 
In the paper, we analyze stock ownership dynamics between both 2005-2007 – with 
strong market conditions - and 2007-2009 – a period of general stock market declines.  We focus 
on changing participation patterns as function of age, education, initial wealth and its 
composition. During the period, undoubtedly both factors, (1) changing participation costs 
arising from the need to reassess the future for equities and (2) the end of a boom market, 
affected households’ portfolio decisions. Analyzing what types of households were more likely 
to enter, stay, and leave the stock market can potentially reveal which of the factors had a 
stronger effect. In addition, we have the capacity to look at companion moves in the portfolio. 
Did those cutting back on equity holdings shift into safer and highly liquid assets to protect an 
uncertain cash flow? 
3. Data and Estimation 
A. Basic Measures and Analysis Outline 
In this analysis we have used observations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), a longitudinal study of U.S. households starting in 1968. The PSID data are from three 
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waves, 2005, 2007 and 2009. During the time period of 2007-2009, the financial crisis occurred 
with the stock market falling from a 2007 peak to a low in the mid-year of 2009 and 
unemployment rising sharply in the latter half of 2008. In contrast, during the time period of 
2005-2007, both the financial market and the overall labor market were robust. By comparing the 
different responses of households in those two different time periods, we can compare 
households’ asset portfolio management actions during a period of prosperity and a period of 
recession. Data from the PSID include both levels of stocks and active saving in stocks (Juster, et. 
al., 2006). 
In using the PSID main family-level data from 2005 to 2009, it should be remembered 
that the data were collected in those calendar years over the approximate time window of April 
to November. This is important especially for our use of the active savings in stocks measure. 
The reference period for buying only, selling only, and for net sales and purchases of stocks is 
from January 1 of the period beginning two calendar years prior to data of the survey. In the 
2007 – 2009 to date of survey time window a family reporting selling stocks could have done so 
at the peak or near peak of the market or could have sold at or near the bottom. For this reason 
the changing patterns of selling and buying need to be considered to have measurement error. 
For example, one might treat selling in the 2007-2009 data period as unwise or ‘bad timing’. Yet, 
the family may have sold in early 2008 before the sharp decline or may have had a specific 
portfolio which was not adversely affected by the wider market decline.   
From information in 2005, 2007, and 2009 we constructed two balanced panels 
corresponding to 2005-2007 and 2007-2009 time periods. The samples were restricted to the 
households with the same head at the beginning and at the end of each period. The primary 
variables of interest are a binary indicator of stockownership, 𝑆𝑡, and dollar amounts by which 
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families increased or decreased their equity holdings in the 2007 and 2009 panels. As suggested 
earlier a potential limitation of our data is that it ignores participation through defined 
contribution plans. Such information is desirable in order to obtain the fuller picture of 
participation dynamics. However, as allocation choices in the defined contribution plans can be 
limited, this information may be less useful for our purposes of determining how cost reductions 
and presumably increased riskiness of holding equities may have affected the participation 
decision. 
Our analysis is organized in three parts. In the first part we document the stock market 
participation patterns in 2005 and 2007 by providing descriptive statistics of various 
characteristics and comparing their mean values in these two periods. The longitudinal nature of 
the data allows us also to distinguish those who recently exited (𝑆𝑡 = 0, 𝑆𝑡−1 = 1) and entered 
(𝑆𝑡 = 1, 𝑆𝑡−1 = 0) the stock market. Considering these two groups may shed light on whether the 
participation changes are more likely to be driven by changes in the entry decision or the exit 
decision. To estimate the effects of income, wealth, age, and education on the stock market 
participation and also to explore changes in these effects, a multivariate approach is required. 
The methods used are OLS regression and logistic regression for our analysis, depending 
on the different types of dependent variables. The PSID core/immigrant family weights in 2005 
and 2007 are used in the regression analysis for the period of 2005-2007 and 2007-2009. For the 
regression analysis in the period of 2007-2009, except for the analysis of creating stock account, 
we initially analyze only the households who had stock accounts as of 2007. A similar analysis 
was carried out for 2005-2007. Some invalid and extreme cases were excluded. 
B. Descriptive Statistics on Net Worth and Transitions 
Table 1 provides a cross-sectional description for the 2005 and 2007 household net worth, 
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based on the whole sample. The results for the whole sample indicate no increase in stock market 
participation between 2005 and 2007. Data in the PSID also include reports of active saving in 
stocks. The questions ask if they have only bought or only sold shares since January of two 
calendar years prior. If so, they are asked the amount sold or purchased. If they report both 
buying and selling, they are then asked how much did they buy or sell, ‘on balance’. 
Notable changes in the sample of 2005-2007 include an increase in wealth, from ($1,000) 
$340.2 in 2005 to $390.1 in 2007 and growth of home equity from $110.1 to $117.2. While 
about 25 percent of families report owning stock in 2005 and 2007, as a point of reference the 
percent of families owning stock as of 2001 (primarily observed before 9/11) was approximately 
30 percent.   
To get a better understanding of the basic stockownership dynamics in 2005 to 2007 and 
to 2009, the observations were divided into one of four groups based on the ownership status in 
the current year and two years prior. These percents fall into these four groups: those who 
recently entered (𝑆𝑡 = 1, 𝑆𝑡−1 = 0), those who recently exited (𝑆𝑡 = 0, 𝑆𝑡−1 = 1), those who 
stayed (𝑆𝑡 = 1, 𝑆𝑡−1 = 1) and those who were persistent non-participants (𝑆𝑡 = 0, 𝑆𝑡−1 = 0) in 
the stock market. See Table 2.  As can be seen, for each of these weighted balanced panels the 
percent of families with non-pension stocks was only slightly lower in the period ending at the 
date of the survey in 2009 (24.4 versus 25.0  percent). The transition from owning to not owning 
shows that 29.2 percent of owners as of 2007 had become non-owners as of 2009 and a 
somewhat smaller transition to non-ownership, 27.2 percent, can be observed for 2005-2007. 
(Z=6.34) These are potentially quite noticeable shifts in relative demand for shares as measured 
by ownership. On the other hand, the Table 2 patterns suggest that there was not a major change 
in participation rates, possibly because participation costs did not change much (Vissing-
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Jorgenson, 2002).36 Yet, who were those shifting out of equity ownership, and, perhaps more 
importantly, by what magnitudes were families adjusting their share values? For families who 
are stock holders in two-year panels, the measured mobility within the value ranges is very 
substantial. See Appendix. 
C. Factors Shaping Stock Market Dynamics 
We begin by analyzing the families who held stocks as of 2007 but who no longer report 
holding stocks as of 2009 (the 29 percent in Table 2). These we assume to be primarily families 
who completely closed their stock accounts, 2007-2009. We use the following variables as the 
predictors: the sex of household head in 2009 (1-male and 0-female), the age group of household 
head in 2009, the education level of household head in 2009, the employment status of 
household head in 2007 and 2009, the employment status of wife in 2007 and 2009 (1-employed 
at the time of survey and 0-otherwise), whether there is a “wife”37 in the household (1-yes and 0-
no) in 2007 and 2009, the household non-pension wealth excluding home equity and stock 
holdings as of the 2007 survey38, the change in total annual family income from the calendar 
year 2006 to calendar year 2008, whether the household has mortgage in 2009 (1-yes and 0-no), 
whether the household has mortgage distress in 2009 (1-yes and 0-no) 39 , the household 
business/farm value category in 2007, and the household stock value category in 2007. For the 
regression analysis in the period of 2005-2007, we just move backward by two years and use the 
                                                            
36 Another approach is to consider Ci , where there are family specific fixed costs, resulting in only those at the margin of 
participation entering the stock market as expected returns improve. 
37 The household head can be female. “No wife” means the household head is single. 
38 Families with equity in own business are found to hold less in the form of publicly traded shares. See Gouskova and 
Stafford, 2005. 
39 We define the household has mortgage distress if any of the following three cases occurs: (1) currently behind on the 
mortgage/loan payment; (2) have worked with the bank or lender to restructure or modify the mortgage/loan; (3) very 
likely or somewhat likely will continue to be behind (or will fall behind) on the mortgage/loan payment in the next 12 
months. See Chen Hurst and Stafford, 2013.  
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same independent variables except for the variable of “whether the household has mortgage 
distress” because the mortgage distress measure variables are not available in the 2007 PSID 
main family-level survey. 
Table 3 presents the logit regression result. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
(1-closed the stock account and 0-did not close the stock account). The higher is the education 
level of head, the less likely is the household to have closed their stock account. People with 
some college or higher education are more knowledgeable and may believe they can weather the 
storm. Another interpretation lies along the lines of fixed costs. With a major shift in the market, 
there are then new fixed costs, P, for deciding to go forward. These are costs of assessing the 
changed nature of the market and how such an investment may fit their longer term plans. For 
those with more education, these costs, P, should generally be lower. People with a higher 
education level are more likely to have stable jobs and better access to credit. This financial 
stability may not be captured with our overall income change measure; more educated families 
may not need to clear their stock accounts when they meet an unexpected negative cash shock. 
Those with mid-range stock holdings ($40,001-$150,000) can be seen as more likely to 
exit the market than those with higher amounts ($150,001 or greater) in 2007-09. In the 2005-
2007 period the families with more stock (>$40,000) are less likely to exit. Households with 
mortgage distress are more likely to close their stock accounts because they need money to pay 
their mortgage debts. Households with equity in their own business showed no differential exit 
from the stock market, 2007-2009. The one case where business equity mattered was for a lower 
exit probability of families with modest wealth in their own business as of 2005.   
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Did people seek greater liquidity as a protection against risk in 2007-2009 (Stafford Chen 
and Schoeni, 2012; Federal Reserve Board, 2012; Sandmo, 1967)? Here we analyze household 
actions on liquid assets. The liquid asset measure includes checking or saving accounts, money 
market funds, certificates of deposit, government saving bonds, and Treasury bills. Table 4 is the 
OLS regression result of the change in liquid assets. The dependent variables are the change in 
liquid assets in the period of 2007-2009 and 2005-2007. One interesting finding is that 
households increased the value of liquid assets when family income increased with a marginal 
propensity to save of .15, at low level of significance in the period of 2005-2007, but they did not 
significantly do so in the period of 2007-2009. The insignificance of the estimated coefficient of 
“increase of family income 06-08” in the 2007-2009 regression is the basis for the large standard 
error, which can be interpreted as indicating a great diversity of household actions. When the 
family income increased, 2006-08, some households increased their liquid assets, while other 
households did not do so because of other cash needs.  
To analyze the net actual transaction amount of stock, we generated a new variable called 
Net Active Stock Allocation (NASA), which measures the actual net transaction value of stock 
(a positive value means net buy and negative value means net sell). As noted above, this variable 
is subject to measurement errors by virtue of the long recall period (at least 24 and up to 32 
months). Also, there is wording on the net amount bought and sold. What was the amount, ‘on 
balance,’ for those reporting that they both bought and sold? Table 5 presents the regression 
result for NASA. One pattern is that of more funds inflowing 2005-07 from those with more 
wealth as of 2005, and those with more stocks as of 2005. In line with the basic wealth allocation 
model in Section II, households with more wealth are significantly more likely to buy more 
stocks in 2005-07, but not significantly in 2007-09. (t>15) 
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Households with mortgage distress in 2009 were more likely to sell stock in 2007-2009. 
Households with greater business/farm value are less likely to buy more stock because the 
business/farm can suffice as a risky asset in the overall portfolio. The households who have more 
than $150,000 in stock in 2005 are more likely to buy more stock during the period of 2005-2007. 
But, we do not find the similar result in the period 2007-2009. (t>15) This is because 2005-2007 
was a good time period for both the overall economy and households, and stock was seen as a 
good investment, and those with more holdings were able to increase them the most. When the 
markets deteriorated, 2007-2009 there was neither a notable dollar reduction nor an increase via 
active (dis)saving in stocks. 
In light of measurement concerns over the complex nature of the NASA measure and to 
further analyze the buy/sell action of households, we generated a simpler categorical variable to 
measure household buy/sell action (neither buy nor sell, only buy or net buy, and only sell or net 
sell). Table 6 presents the logistic regression results. Households with more wealth were more 
likely to buy stock in both the periods of 2005-2007 and 2007-2009. People with mortgage 
distress in 2009 were less likely to buy stock in the period of 2007-2009. Households with 
greater business/farm value were less likely to buy stock, which is consistent with the results in 
Table 5. Households with more stock are more likely to buy stock in both the period of 2005-
2007 and of 2007-2009. 
As a function of age, the fraction of stockholders has often been found to exhibit a hump-
shape pattern (Americks and Zeldes, 2001; Wang 2003). From Table 3, we have seen that as of 
2007 the older families (age 65 and older is the excluded group) were less likely to exit the stock 
market. Presumably higher expected returns (𝐸𝑅𝑟) on stocks relative to safer assets motivated 
persistence, even if they saw more risk and were becoming less risk tolerant (𝑘𝜎𝑟2  rising). 
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Review of age stock-ownership profiles as of 1999 when the dot-com market was in full effect 
also shows a departure from the expected pattern of lower ownership of equities among the older 
age families. 
In contrast to the analysis of closing stock account in Table 3, we also analyze the case of 
opening new stock account. Table 7 is the logit regression result of opening new stock account. 
In the sample for 2007-2009, we only include the households without stock account as of the 
survey date in 2007. The dependent variable is a dummy variable (1-open a stock account before 
the 2009 survey and 0 - still no stock account at the time of the 2009 survey). We carry out a 
similar analysis for the period of 2005-2007. Young people are less likely to open new stock 
accounts in both the period of 2005-2007 and of 2007-2009.  
In comparison to those of age 35-64, older households are more likely to become new 
stock owners as of 2005-07. So, in times of good stock market performance it appears that older 
families, were less likely to exit and, in an additional apparent contradiction to the life cycle asset 
allocation perspective, they were more likely to become new entrants. This suggests an 
augmented conceptual perspective with possibly a retirement financial plan which relies more on 
stocks in early retirement years for the sake of a better return, even at the cost of added risk. 
Further, they may allocate to a set of lower risk stocks, and this is not captured by the measure 
used here. 
The data analyzed so far can be reorganized to create another measure of weathering the 
financial storm; namely, capital losses in the stock market. The measure can be defined as  
CAP LOSS/GAIN = STOCK07 – STOCK09 + NASA. Table 8 presents the results. Here it is 
quite important to allow for the widely varying scale of stock ownership. Here we allow for the 
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wide range of stock values by adding measures of ranges of initial stock holdings. One pattern to 
be observed is that in 2005-2007 older families were less likely to experience a loss, but in 2007-
2009, ‘older but wiser’ seems not to apply. Only the youngest age group seems to have 
experienced somewhat larger capital losses. Education seems to have little relationship to capital 
losses. 
In the context of the investment cost and risk model of Section II, we can see how a drop 
in the market can impact those with a substantial initial exposure. For both 2005-07 and 2007-09, 
those with greater initial balances were those with larger losses. For 2005-2007 these losses may 
reflect mean reversion – reversion to a stable or even rising mean. For 2007-2009 there is also 
likely mean reversion, but the overall mean is also declining, leading to even larger losses for 
those with more in the game as of 2007. From the patterns in Table 8 we do not know if those 
with the large losses were realized through selling at a loss beyond the date of interview in 2009. 
However, we do know that capital value changes in equities appear to shape consumption and 
saving (Juster, et.al., 2006), even if going forward the value recovers. 
4. Conclusion  
Based on panel data, we have been able to explore the financial behavior of households 
with respect to stock market participation, both in a time of rising equity values and then a 
substantial overall decline. The panel supports the study of difference in levels and includes 
additional measures of active saving and dissaving in the form of equities. While the latter 
measures are quite imperfect, owing in part to the long and variable time intervals of recall, they 
do help provide a more complete picture of stock market activity. As expected, the repeated 
panels show a decline in new entrants to the stock market and some rise in exits from the stock 
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market when comparing 2007-09 to 2005-07. The issue of ceasing to participate by those at low 
levels of stock holdings, as predicted by a basic portfolio theory with fixed costs, seems to be in 
close alignment with the empirical results. In addition, the exit and activity patterns are 
consistent with the overall market changes. Those with more education are shown to be less 
likely to exit, especially during the 2007-2009 period. 
In terms of life cycle effects, families headed by a person age 65 or older were less likely 
to exit in good times (2005-07) and were more likely to become stock owners in both 2005-07 
and 2007-09. This appears inconsistent with the basic life cycle asset allocation (LCAA) 
perspective. It may be that those 65 and older are reallocating for better returns at the expense of 
added risk. Since our measures do not include the specific composition of stocks, the older 
population may be shifting to a lower risk portfolio in terms of the composition of the stocks by 
moving to broader index funds, for example. On the other hand, using the simple indicator 
measure (Table 6) or in the net active asset allocation (NASA) measures, there are not 
indications of greater allocations into stocks by the elderly, and in 2007-09 there are greater 
levels of buy or net buy among the younger households, a pattern consistent with the LCAA 
thesis.  
Our exploration of who shifted to safer lower risk assets (Table 4) showed little in the 
way of clear patterns. While families may have wished to reallocate to safer liquid assets, in the 
context of the recession, many found themselves drawing down liquid assets. During the more 
normal 2005-2007 period, there was the expected relationship between current income change 
(2006-2008) and greater saving in the form of liquid assets. 
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The panel analysis based on flow measures in comparison with the change in levels 
provides some different information. The exit and enter decision can be over modest dollar 
values of holdings. One model was based on the combined use of the levels and NASA measures. 
Namely a measure of net capital losses or gains was constructed. This measure offered some 
quite interesting insights.   The predictors included the value ranges in the baseline year. For 
higher levels of market exposure, the extent of capital losses was greater in both the 2005-07 and 
in 2007-09 periods. However, the magnitude of the losses at a given value range in the upper two 
value ranges ($40,001 - $150,000 and $150,001 or greater) was notably greater during 2007-09. 
This suggests a model of inter-temporal variability and reversion to the mean. In 2007-2009 this 
process was operating, and, in addition, the overall mean was declining substantially. Overall, 
the patterns speak to the premise of risk of greater loss for larger allocations to risky asset 
categories. 
The recession of 2008-09 was accompanied by substantial disruption in the housing 
market, especially in terms of mortgage problems. The observed connection between mortgage 
distress and then exiting, selling, not buying and not entering the stock market creates a 
concerning feedback wherein the housing market crisis pushed a move away from the stock 
market. With PSID families representing $6 trillion in the stock market as of 2007, the induced 




Ameriks, J. and Zeldes, S. P. [2001], How do household portfolio shares vary with age? 
          http://www-1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/szeldes/Research. 
Antoniewicz, Rochelle, “A Comparison of the Household Sector from the Flow of Funds  
         Accounts and the Survey of Consumer Finances,”  working paper, Federal Reserve Board 
         of Governors, October, 2000. 
Bertaut, C. [1998], ‘Stockholding behavior of U.S. households: Evidence from the 1983-1989  
        Survey of Consumer Finances’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 80. 
Bertaut, C. C. and Starr-McCluer, M. [2002], “Household portfolios in the united states,”  in 
             Household Portfolios, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 181–217. 
Bogan, V. [2004], “Stock Market Participation and the Internet.” working paper,  
            Brown University.  
Bridges, Thomas and Frank P.Stafford, “At the Corner of Main and Wall Street: Family Pension 
Responses to Liquidity Changes and Perceived Returns,” Working Paper, Michigan 
Retirement Research Center, 2012. 
Campbell, John Y. and Luis M. Viciera, Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long 
Term Investors, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Deaton, Angus, Understanding Consumption, Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Dominitz, Jeff, and Charles F. Manski, “Measuring and Interpreting Expectations of Equity 
Returns,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 26, p 352-370, 2011. 
Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release, Table F.225.i, June 7, 2012. 
Gouskova, Elena, Ngina S. Chiteji and Frank P. Stafford, “Financial Market Participation Over 
the Life Course,” in Wealth Accumulation and Communities of Color in the United 
States: Current Issues (Jessica Gordon Nehmbard and Ngina Chiteji, eds), 2006 
Guiso, L., Haliassos, M. and Jappelli, T. [2003],  “Household stockholding in Europe where do  
             we stand and where do we go? “ CEPR Discussion Papers 3694. 
Haliassos, M. and Bertaut, C. [1995], ‘Why do so few hold stocks?’ Economic Journal 
            105(432), 1110–1129. 
Haliassos, M. and Michaelides, A. [2003], ‘Portfolio choice and liquidity constraints’ 
108 
 
        International  Economic Review, 44(1), 143–177. 
Hurd, Michael, and Suzanne Rohwedder, “Stock Price Expectations and Stock Trading,” 
Working Paper 17973, National Bureau of Economic Research, April, 2012. 
Hudomiet, Péter, Gábor Kédzi and Robert J. Willis, “Stock Market Crash and Expectations of 
American Households,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 26, p. 393-415, 2011. 
Juster, F. Thomas, James P. Smith and Frank P. Stafford, “The Measurement and Structure of 
Household Wealth,’ Labour Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, June, 1999.  
__________,  Joseph Lupton, James P. Smith and Frank P. Stafford, “The Decline in Household 
Savings and the Wealth Effect,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 2006. 
Kédzi, Gabor and Robert Willis, “Household Stock Market Beliefs and Learning,” Working 
Paper 17614, National Bureau of Economic Research, November, 2011.  
Paiella, M. [2001], “Limited financial market participation: a transaction cost-based 
           explanation,” The  Institute for Fiscal Studies, UK, working paper. 
Poterba, J. M. [2001], The rise of the ”equity culture” U.S. stockownership patterns, 1989-1998. 
            working paper, http://econ -www.mit.edu/faculty/poterba/files/aea2001.pdf. 
Sandmo, Agnar, “The Effect of Uncertainty on Savings Decisions,” Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, p.353-360. 
Stafford, Frank P., Erik Hurst, and Bing Chen, “Diminishing Margins: Housing Market Declines 
and Family Financial Responses,” Working Paper 2012-276, Michigan Retirement 
Research Center, December 2012. 
________, Bing Chen and Robert Schoeni, “Mortgage Distress and Financial Liquidity: How 
U.S. Families are Handling Savings, Mortgages and Other Debts,” Research Note, 
Institute for Social Research, May, 2012. 
Survey of Consumer Finances [1964]. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan,  
            Ann Arbor, 1962. 
Vissing-Jorgensen, A., “Towards an Explanation of Household Portfolio Choice  
           Heterogeneity: Nonfinancial Income and Participation Cost Structure,” working paper,  
           Northwestern University, 2002.  
109 
 
Wang, Y., “Participation decision and portfolio choice over the life-cycle,” working paper,  
         University of Chicago. 2002. 






























  2005 2007 
      Percent 
Conditional on 
Own     Percent 
Conditional on 
Own 
  Mean  Median Own Mean  Median Mean  Median Own Mean  Median 
Business 45.2 0.0 11.8% 396.4 65.9 70.2 0.0 11.6% 626.2 103.5 
Checking/Savings 27.4 3.3 83.5% 33.9 5.5 29.2 3.1 85.2% 35.5 5.6 
Other Debt 9.0 0.2 52.7% 17.6 6.6 11.3 0.2 52.6% 22.2 8.3 
Real Estate 46.0 0.0 16.5% 290.3 87.8 57.4 0.0 16.5% 361.9 103.5 
Stocks 50.0 0.0 25.2% 204.4 49.5 56.1 0.0 24.9% 232.9 51.7 
IRA 40.0 0.0 34.4% 120.6 44.0 46.4 0.0 33.4% 143.4 46.6 
Vehicle 14.7 8.8       14.7 8.3       
Other 15.6 0.0 19.6% 82.9 16.5 10.2 0.0 17.8% 59.4 15.5 
Home Equity 110.1 39.3 71.0% 169.3 98.8 117.2 41.4 69.9% 182.8 104.5 
Total 340.2 87.8       390.1 91.1       
 
Table 3.1: Household Wealth: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Thousands of 2009 dollars) 
 
Notes: 40 
1. Ownership status for vehicles was not asked. Only the value was asked. 
2.  All calculations are done using PSID weights. 
3. The full sample includes all households in a given year. The race 
distinction in these tables do not 'aggregate' to these full sample values 
since they do not include non-black, non-white Hispanics which are 
included in the full sample. 
4. PSID wealth does not include pension wealth. Therefore, this excludes the 
present value of private defined contribution and defined benefit plans. It 








                                                            
40 Source:  Trends in Household Wealth Dynamics, 2005-2007 ( Elena Gouskova and Frank 




     
 
  
Whether Own Stock in 
2009 
   
 
Yes No Total 
Whether Own Stock in 
2007 
Yes 17.27% 7.12% 24.39% 
No 6.09% 69.52% 75.61% 
 
Total 23.36% 76.64% 
 
     
    
Whether Own Stock in 
2009 
   
 
Yes No Total 
Whether Own Stock in 
2007 
Yes 70.80% 29.20% 100.00% 
No 8.05% 91.95% 100.00% 
     
     
     
    
Whether Own Stock in 
2007 
   
 
Yes No Total 
Whether Own Stock in 
2005 
Yes 18.22% 6.79% 25.02% 
No 6.76% 68.22% 74.98% 
 
Total 24.98% 75.02% 
 
     
    
Whether Own Stock in 
2007 
   
 
Yes No Total 
Whether Own Stock in 
2005 
Yes 72.84% 27.16% 100.00% 
No 9.02% 90.98% 100.00% 









  Clear Stock Account 
  2007-2009 2005-2007 
Intercept -0.2099 0.3218 
 
(0.4899) (0.4526) 
sex_head_09 (07) 0.6133** -0.2711 
 
(0.3114) (0.2995) 
age_head_09 (07)<=34 0.025 0.7145** 
 
(0.3244) (0.3417) 
34<age_head_09 (07)<=49 -0.0376 0.5992** 
 
(0.2999) (0.2947) 
49<age_head_09 (07)<=64 -0.0253 0.6448** 
 
(0.2732) (0.2686) 
edu_head_09 (07)=12 -0.3063 -0.2626 
 
(0.3777) (0.3428) 
12<edu_head_09 (07)<=16 -0.8821** -0.5003 
 
(0.3715) (0.3293) 
edu_head_09 (07)=17 -1.0116*** -0.9513*** 
 
(0.391) (0.3666) 
Employed_head_07 (05) -0.2029 -0.3383 
 
(0.3078) (0.2743) 
Employed_wife_07 (05) 0.4821* -0.09 
 
(0.2611) (0.2714) 
No_wife_07 (05) 0.5404 -0.2254 
 
(0.4294) (0.5072) 
Employed_head_09 (07) 0.2277 -0.0588 
 
(0.2659) (0.2727) 
Employed_wife_09 (07) -0.4004 -0.0538 
 
(0.2478) (0.2692) 
No_wife_09 (07) -0.2164 0.1702 
 
(0.4148) (0.5156) 
wealth exclude home equity and stock_07 (05) (K) -0.0009*** -0.0004 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Increase of family income 06-08 (04-06) (K) -0.0028 -0.0025 
 
(0.0018) (0.002) 
Whether own mortgage_09 (07) 0.1275 -0.116 
 
(0.182) (0.171) 




 50K<business value_07 (05)<=200K 0.2116 -0.8862* 
 
(0.3367) (0.505) 





10K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=40K -0.5905*** -0.2742 
 
(0.2121) (0.2022) 
40K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=150K -0.5825*** -0.9292*** 
 
(0.2079) (0.2143) 
Stock value in 07 (05)>150K -1.0019*** -0.8587*** 
 
(0.2488) (0.2492) 
Number of observation 1188 1187 
Note: 
  Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 








  ∆ Liquid Asset ($1,000) 
  2007-2009 2005-2007 
Intercept -33.3607* 22.4946 
 
(18.9752) (15.6958) 
sex_head_09 (07) 26.2158* 2.372 
 
(13.961) (9.0472) 
age_head_09 (07)<=34 -20.1257* -10.2589 
 
(10.994) (7.4736) 
34<age_head_09 (07)<=49 -16.0352 -7.7622 
 
(11.997) (8.598) 
49<age_head_09 (07)<=64 -2.2029 -2.2166 
 
(10.6881) (7.573) 
edu_head_09 (07)=12 9.5184 -6.0049 
 
(10.6552) (14.3554) 
12<edu_head_09 (07)<=16 6.0109 -11.3725 
 
(9.9885) (13.3179) 
edu_head_09 (07)=17 11.907 -7.7556 
 
(10.3187) (13.7927) 
Employed_head_07 (05) 11.9573 13.0385 
 
(10.3471) (10.3772) 
Employed_wife_07 (05) 9.0052 23.495** 
 
(9.2258) (10.5591) 
No_wife_07 (05) 34.8047** 18.4312 
 
(14.809) (13.8471) 
Employed_head_09 (07) 8.9526 -12.5475 
 
(10.3545) (9.6312) 
Employed_wife_09 (07) -5.6891 -23.0026** 
 
(8.7789) (10.7261) 
No_wife_09 (07) -17.1906 -17.8933 
 
(14.1848) (13.9183) 
wealth exclude home equity and stock_07 (05) (K) 0.0042 -0.011 
 
(0.0185) (0.0085) 
Increase of family income 06-08 (04-06) (K) 0.1064 0.151* 
 
(0.0843) (0.0771) 
Whether own mortgage_09 (07) -8.0132 -1.5906 
 
(5.9491) (5.351) 




 50K<business value_07 (05)<=200K -12.5983 -14.8789 
 
(16.5161) (10.1483) 





10K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=40K -10.9381 -0.1758 
 
(7.0336) (6.1339) 
40K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=150K -4.1961 -1.0536 
 
(7.64) (6.2363) 
Stock value in 07 (05)>150K 11.7386 -0.0635 
 
(9.4009) (7.883) 
Number of observation 1183 1181 
Note: 
  Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 






































  NASA ($1,000) 
  2007-2009 2005-2007 
Intercept -2.2579 -1.5831 
 
(4.3235) (1.9919) 
sex_head_09 (07) 3.3406 -0.2 
 
(2.5133) (1.7577) 
age_head_09 (07)<=34 -0.7058 -2.2427 
 
(1.6517) (2.2359) 
34<age_head_09 (07)<=49 1.7139 -2.2695 
 
(1.9096) (2.3331) 
49<age_head_09 (07)<=64 -0.5245 -2.9015 
 
(1.6837) (2.1925) 
edu_head_09 (07)=12 -2.6104 -0.3244 
 
(2.7181) (1.3534) 
12<edu_head_09 (07)<=16 -2.5995 0.8717 
 
(2.7873) (1.0107) 
edu_head_09 (07)=17 -1.5423 -0.7299 
 
(3.0479) (1.5032) 
Employed_head_07 (05) 0.5235 4.6436** 
 
(1.6996) (2.0798) 
Employed_wife_07 (05) -0.5341 0.1881 
 
(1.4755) (2.2786) 
No_wife_07 (05) 5.0802** -3.5229 
 
(2.4776) (2.5715) 
Employed_head_09 (07) 0.0408 0.3012 
 
(1.7228) (1.9388) 
Employed_wife_09 (07) 0.3666 0.4986 
 
(1.3496) (2.1918) 
No_wife_09 (07) -2.2093 3.261 
 
(2.2447) (2.7018) 
wealth exclude home equity and stock_07 (05) (K) 0.0032 0.0047** 
 
(0.002) (0.0022) 
Increase of family income 06-08 (04-06) (K) 0.0409*** 0.0085 
 
(0.0149) (0.0187) 
Whether own mortgage_09 (07) 0.4357 -1.6198 
 
(1.2711) (1.198) 




 50K<business value_07 (05)<=200K -6.6172* -6.0914 
 
(3.6806) (3.9947) 





10K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=40K 1.9417** 1.1876 
 
(0.9813) (1.0125) 
40K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=150K 0.1796 -0.7712 
 
(0.9013) (1.0116) 
Stock value in 07 (05)>150K 2.1692 5.8036*** 
 
(1.8945) (2.048) 
Number of observation 1083 1070 
Note: 
  Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 
 *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
    

















  2007-2009 2005-2007 
  
Buy or net 
buy 
Sell or net 
sell Buy or net buy Sell or net sell 
Intercept -2.4414*** -2.6694*** -3.0795*** -3.4682*** 
 
(0.6981) (1.0082) (0.5962) (1.2055) 
sex_head_09 (07) 0.1561 -0.1865 0.4105 0.0871 
 
(0.3854) (0.422) (0.3443) (0.4617) 
age_head_09 (07)<=34 0.9872*** 0.091 0.3777 0.2401 
 
(0.3726) (0.4937) (0.3726) (0.5334) 
34<age_head_09 (07)<=49 1.0643*** -0.0891 0.4552 0.1266 
 
(0.3241) (0.4238) (0.3132) (0.468) 
49<age_head_09 (07)<=64 0.6528** 0.2793 -0.0328 0.0709 
 
(0.2794) (0.3478) (0.2843) (0.3601) 
edu_head_09 (07)=12 -0.1535 0.1633 0.1879 1.527 
 
(0.5343) (0.816) (0.49) (1.0624) 
12<edu_head_09 (07)<=16 0.5527 0.9094 0.5225 1.6434 
 
(0.5111) (0.7757) (0.4596) (1.048) 
edu_head_09 (07)=17 0.3942 0.7441 0.5116 1.7639* 
 
(0.5298) (0.7886) (0.4838) (1.056) 
Employed_head_07 (05) -0.017 -0.0121 0.4863* -0.429 
 
(0.2828) (0.3691) (0.2888) (0.4698) 
Employed_wife_07 (05) -0.7426*** -0.1617 -0.163 -0.374 
 
(0.2814) (0.4114) (0.2655) (0.3786) 
No_wife_07 (05) 0.7914* -0.7714 -0.0698 0.166 
 
(0.4711) (0.6915) (0.4236) (0.672) 
Employed_head_09 (07) -0.2118 -0.0344 -0.1745 0.0877 
 
(0.2658) (0.3503) (0.2784) (0.4526) 
Employed_wife_09 (07) 0.2468 -0.0203 0.2717 0.3166 
 
(0.283) (0.3988) (0.2593) (0.3889) 
No_wife_09 (07) -1.1329** 0.8997 0.503 -0.1021 
 
(0.505) (0.6405) (0.4253) (0.713) 
wealth exclude home equity and stock_07 (05) (K) 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0007*** 0.0003 
 
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Increase of family income 06-08 (04-06) (K) 0.0022 0.0005 0.0029 0.0031 
 
(0.002) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0028) 
Whether own mortgage_09 (07) 0.0222 0.0018 -0.0691 -0.014 
 
(0.2039) (0.2651) (0.1877) (0.2682) 




  50K<business value_07 (05)<=200K -0.4611 0.5159 0.034 -0.0992 
 
(0.4353) (0.3898) (0.3581) (0.564) 




(0.4066) (0.8069) (0.4447) (0.5464) 
10K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=40K 0.6799** 0.1412 0.7584*** -0.0548 
 
(0.2653) (0.3517) (0.2439) (0.3412) 
40K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=150K 0.7671*** 0.3062 0.7123*** 0.2724 
 
(0.2537) (0.3278) (0.2526) (0.3062) 
Stock value in 07 (05)>150K 1.2387*** 0.6639* 1.0473*** 0.1887 
 
(0.2632) (0.3392) (0.2633) (0.3399) 
Number of observation 1164 1164 
Note: 
    Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 
   *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
    
 
 

































  Create Stock Account 
  2007-2009 2005-2007 
Intercept -2.9968*** -2.7966*** 
 
(0.4458) (0.374) 
sex_head_09 (07) -0.2631 -0.1588 
 
(0.2639) (0.2529) 
age_head_09 (07)<=34 -0.5352** -0.8921*** 
 
(0.2353) (0.2709) 
34<age_head_09 (07)<=49 -0.796*** -0.7437*** 
 
(0.2448) (0.2519) 
49<age_head_09 (07)<=64 -0.4445* -0.6158** 
 
(0.227) (0.2561) 
edu_head_09 (07)=12 0.695** 0.6786*** 
 
(0.3207) (0.2442) 
12<edu_head_09 (07)<=16 1.2875*** 0.9727*** 
 
(0.3073) (0.2454) 
edu_head_09 (07)=17 1.3355*** 1.3375*** 
 
(0.3671) (0.3017) 
Employed_head_07 (05) -0.1855 0.111 
 
(0.2276) (0.2351) 
Employed_wife_07 (05) -0.0304 0.2525 
 
(0.2126) (0.26) 
No_wife_07 (05) -0.0682 -0.1006 
 
(0.3964) (0.4998) 
Employed_head_09 (07) 0.1715 -0.0556 
 
(0.2054) (0.2067) 
Employed_wife_09 (07) 0.2743 0.145 
 
(0.2076) (0.2563) 
No_wife_09 (07) -0.2501 -0.2362 
 
(0.3917) (0.5064) 
wealth exclude home equity and stock_07 (05) (K) 0.0009*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Increase of family income 06-08 (04-06) (K) 0.0048** 0.0016 
 
(0.0021) (0.0019) 
Whether own mortgage_09 (07) 0.5434*** 0.4118*** 
 
(0.1604) (0.1581) 




 50K<business value_07 (05)<=200K -0.0445 0.6837** 
 
(0.381) (0.3189) 





Number of observation 5507 5231 
Note: 
  Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 
 *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
  





























  Capital Loss (K) 
  2007-2009 2005-2007 
Intercept -30.5369 15.2761 
 
(23.591) (22.5781) 
sex_head_09 (07) 19.5566 -22.8025* 
 
(13.2895) (13.1267) 
age_head_09 (07)<=34 20.356* 45.0234*** 
 
(11.8055) (13.755) 
34<age_head_09 (07)<=49 14.2781 36.9654*** 
 
(10.9502) (13.5494) 
49<age_head_09 (07)<=64 4.4151 39.6979*** 
 
(11.0342) (13.6898) 
edu_head_09 (07)=12 1.2558 -20.1707 
 
(17.5514) (17.6944) 
12<edu_head_09 (07)<=16 -9.1527 -16.6539 
 
(17.646) (17.5498) 
edu_head_09 (07)=17 -2.647 -51.2671*** 
 
(19.0652) (19.3384) 
Employed_head_07 (05) 1.0502 -1.7555 
 
(10.687) (12.0817) 
Employed_wife_07 (05) 9.1734 9.6844 
 
(9.0212) (13.6495) 
No_wife_07 (05) 40.9221 -21.8444 
 
(28.6967) (21.997) 
Employed_head_09 (07) -0.1256 -31.046** 
 
(9.4134) (12.5044) 
Employed_wife_09 (07) -15.606* 0.4079 
 
(8.2353) (13.3509) 
No_wife_09 (07) -36.1252 26.857 
 
(29.1269) (22.1344) 
wealth exclude home equity and stock_07 (05) (K) 0.0011 -0.0531*** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0176) 
Increase of family income 06-08 (04-06) (K) -0.0578 -0.018 
 
(0.0826) (0.1326) 
Whether own mortgage_09 (07) 2.2534 11.3682 
 
(6.6434) (8.8199) 









business value_07 (05)>200K -0.1387 56.9734*** 
 
(17.8939) (20.7584) 
10K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=40K 4.9726 4.8171 
 
(4.8823) (6.0319) 
40K<Stock value in 07 (05)<=150K 44.0414*** 20.5792*** 
 
(5.6541) (7.1159) 
Stock value in 07 (05)>150K 166.6392*** 105.5345*** 
 
(12.2247) (15.3229) 
Number of observation 1025 1015 
Note: 
  Numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations. 
 *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 






















Stock Value<=15K 15K<Stock Value<=70K 70K<Stock Value<=216K 216K<Stock Value<=1000K Stock Value>1000K Total
Stock Value<=12.1K 17.14% 4.61% 2.55% 0.80% 0.00% 25.10%
12.1K<Stock Value<=50K 5.13% 13.71% 4.00% 2.30% 0.08% 25.22%
50K<Stock Value<=190K 2.35% 4.60% 12.02% 5.42% 0.64% 25.03%
190K<Stock Value<=800K 0.89% 1.64% 4.93% 11.37% 0.90% 19.74%
Stock Value>800K 0.17% 0.50% 0.87% 1.39% 1.98% 4.92%






Stock Value<=12K 12K<Stock Value<=50K 50K<Stock Value<=200K 200K<Stock Value<=900K Stock Value>900K Total
Stock Value<=14K 15.92% 5.30% 2.40% 1.62% 0.00% 25.24%
14K<Stock Value<=70K 6.16% 13.67% 4.97% 1.04% 0.14% 25.98%
70K<Stock Value<=220K 2.58% 4.42% 12.44% 3.98% 0.64% 24.06%
220K<Stock Value<=1000K 1.32% 1.42% 6.09% 10.48% 1.30% 20.61%
Stock Value>1000K 0.00% 0.05% 0.67% 1.16% 2.23% 4.11%





Appendix 3.1: Stock Market Holdings Transition Table 
